In recent years Canada, joined by other countries,
has shown remarkable leadership in the global effort to ban landmines.
Government of Canada representatives were key to negotiating the Mine Ban Treaty
and Canada was the first country to sign and to ratify it. Canada was among the
first countries to begin to destroy its stockpile of AP mines. It was also one
of the first countries to announce funds for mine action. Funding in the amount
of CAN$100 million[1] was
allocated for implementation of the Treaty, including mine clearance and
provision of assistance to victims. Canada has made available financial and
technical assistance to other governments, enabling them to meet their
obligations under the Treaty. The government has facilitated NGO involvement in
various aspects of the Mine Ban Treaty and mine action in general.
However, there remain areas of concern that should be addressed and clarified
by the government of Canada. Some of these are: the addendum to Canada’s
Instrument of Ratification on the issue of interoperability; the status of
certain antivehicle mines and Claymore mines in Canada’s arsenal;
differences in the definition of “antipersonnel mine” between the
Mine Ban Treaty and Canada’s domestic legislation; and, money from the
Canadian Landmine Fund allocated to research and development on alternatives to
antipersonnel landmines.
Mine Ban Policy
Canada was the first nation to sign the ban
convention on 3 December 1997. This was followed immediately by the submission
of its instrument of ratification to the UN Secretary General in New
York.[2] Canada appended to its
ratification an understanding with respect to joint operations that is discussed
below.
Canada’s support for a ban on AP mines was first demonstrated on 17
January 1996 during the review of the Convention on Conventional Weapons when
Canadian officials announced an immediate moratorium on the production, transfer
and operational use of AP
mines.[3] On 2 October 1996, it
was announced that the destruction of two-thirds of Canadian stockpiles of AP
mines would begin immediately with the remainder of stocks to be destroyed in
the context of an international ban. The Ottawa Process was launched 5 October
1996 when, during the closing plenary of the conference “Towards a Global
Ban on Antipersonnel Mines,” Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy
invited other governments to return to Ottawa in December 1997, to sign a treaty
banning antipersonnel mines.[4]An intensive 14-month period of demarches, bilateral and multilateral
meetings and negotiations with governments and NGOs followed the announcement.
In addition to offering support for various initiatives, Canadian officials
provided logistical support and used several means to build broad public and
political support for the mine ban. For example, Canadian funds were made
available to representatives of several governments who could not otherwise have
taken part in several key meetings. Additionally, a quarterly publication was
launched to keep both the public and government representatives apprised of
developments throughout the process.
Frequently Canadian officials helped to draft the text and worked to build
support for various UN, regional, and Ottawa Process resolutions centered on AP
mines. These included UNGA Resolution 51/45S, 10 December 1996, calling for an
international agreement to ban AP mines, UNGA Resolution 52/38A in 1997
calling on all member states to sign the Mine Ban Treaty, the June 1997
Brussels Declaration committing nations to the December treaty signing, and the
1996 Organization of American States resolution calling for a hemispheric mine
free zone. To date it is one of only six OAS member states to submit
information to the OAS Register of Antipersonnel
Landmines.[5] In other fora such
as the G-8 and the Commonwealth, Canadian officials worked continually to place
the ban issue on these and other agendas.
From a Canadian perspective, perhaps one of the most significant developments
following the conclusion of the treaty was the creation of the Mine Action Team
(ILX) within DFAIT and the appointment of an Ambassador for Mine Action. The
creation of a new division within the Ministry, mandated specifically to work on
landmines was intended not only to move the treaty process forward but also to
ensure that “Canada is able to continue to provide international
leadership on the landmines
issue.”[6]
Another initiative supported by Canada is Landmine Monitor. In a press
release announcing Canadian financial support for the Landmine Monitor
initiative Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy said “(m)onitoring
compliance is about making sure that the Convention becomes much more than words
on paper?. It is about making sure that the Convention will have concrete
impact on the lives of people who must live with landmines every
day.”[7]
In 1998, Canada issued two policy statements that address AP mines. The
LYSOEN Declaration outlines a framework for Canada and Norway to enhance foreign
policy consultations and cooperation on several issues, including landmines and
small arms proliferation “with a view to enhancing human security,
promoting human rights, strengthening humanitarian law, preventing conflict and
fostering democracy and good
governance.”[8] The
Canada-EU Statement on Small Arms and Antipersonnel
Mines,[9] although not a signed or
negotiated document, is especially significant for its reference to military
exports, particularly small arms. On the anniversary of the Treaty signing a
report, prepared by ILX, was tabled in Parliament, giving Members of Parliament
an outline of international progress on the Mine Ban Treaty, global mine action
and a general description of how Canadian funds for mine action have been
committed.1[0]
In 1997 the Department for National Defence authorized the formation of its
Antipersonnel Landmine Working Group. Policy Guidelines published in the
department's Personnel Newsletter in June 1997 outlined activities prohibited to
Canadian Forces personnel such as stockpiling, acquisition and use of AP mines.
A more recent publication in November 1998 addresses rules of engagement,
participation in combined operations, planning and command and
control.1[1]
Understanding on Joint Operations
Canada appended the following “understanding” to its ratification
instrument:
“It is the understanding of the Government of Canada that, in the
context of operations, exercises or other military activity sanctioned by the
United Nations or otherwise conducted in accordance with the international law,
the mere participation by the Canadian Forces, or individual Canadians, in
operations, exercises or other military activity conducted in combination with
the armed forces of States not party to the Convention which engage in activity
prohibited under the Convention would not, by itself, be considered to be
assistance, encouragement or inducement in accordance with the meaning of those
terms in Article 1, paragraph
1(c).”1[2]
This understanding seems clearly aimed at permitting Canadian forces to fight
side-by-side with the United States in a war in which U.S. forces use
antipersonnel mines.
There is concern about the consistency of the Canadian understanding with the
treaty’s obligation under Article 1, “never under any
circumstances...[t]o assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage
in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this
Convention.”1[3] At worst,
the understanding could be interpreted to constitute a reservation to the
treaty, and reservations are prohibited under Article 19. At best, the
understanding goes against the spirit of a treaty aimed at an end to all
possession and use of antipersonnel mines.
Canadian officials have said that the intent of the understanding is mainly
to ensure Canadian military personnel are able to participate fully in joint
operations, for example with NATO allies, without fear of prosecution.
According to one key official, “Canada’s ‘understanding’
was carefully researched and worded in an attempt to clarify a situation which
is a reality for Canada – that as a member of a military alliance such as
NATO, or as an active participant in UN sanctioned operations, we may find
ourselves engaging in military operations with an ally that is not signatory to
the Convention. In short, we were simply attempting to indicate our perceptions
of our obligations under the Convention under a set of specific circumstances.
In this case our perception is that ‘the mere participation by the
Canadian Forces, or individual Canadians’ in such coalition operations
would not be considered to be efforts to ‘assist, encourage or
induce’ others to engage in activities prohibited by the Convention. We
believe that this is a realistic ‘perception of our obligations’
which does not in any way undermine the core obligations of the
Convention.”1[4]
The Canadian Forces (CF) and the Department of National Defense (DND) were
central to the drafting of Canada’s
understanding.1[5] They voiced
concern in early 1997 about the impact of the prohibition on
“assistance” on joint operations. “The question was whether
or not the Canadian Forces could legally work with an ally who retained the
right to use a weapon which Ottawa considered illegal,” writes Major Paul
W. Fredenburg, who was deeply involved in the discussions, in a recent article
published in Canadian Defense
Quarterly.1[6] “This could
jeopardize interoperability with those allies and thus compromise Canada’s
defense alliances." Fredenburg states that the concerns on joint operations
were also recognized and discussed in the NATO and ABCA (Australia, Britain,
Canada and America) fora.1[7] The
position taken by DND in this area was reflected in the June 1997 APL
Operational Planning and Policy Guidelines where, “...the use of [AP
mines] by an ally in NATO, UN or coalition operations will not preclude the
deployment of the Canadian Forces nor effect interoperability with those
allies.”1[8]
According to Fredenburg, during the treaty negotiations the concerns of the
Canadian Forces were examined at great length by the Canadian delegation. "The
word ‘assist’ was interpreted as meaning direct assistance in
actually laying the mine. Normal assistance provided to the force as a whole,
such as fuel and security, would not be considered to be in contravention of the
treaty."1[9] Indeed, the Canadian
implementation legislation allows for participation in joint operations with
mine users “if that participation does not amount to active assistance in
that prohibited
activity.”2[0]
Fredenburg also says, “It was generally agreed that command and control
of a U.S.-led coalition would continue to create problems especially in case of
joint command. The status of exchange officers serving with U.S. units with a
mine-laying role would also be problematic. It was agreed that this issue will
have to be resolved first in NATO and any solution or agreement will, by common
practice, be extended to the
ABCA.”2[1]
Bill C-22
Bill C-22, An Act to implement the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on their
Destruction was given Royal Assent by the Parliament of Canada on 27
November 1997 and is currently listed in the Statutes of Canada, Chapter
33.2[2] The Statute was approved
by the Governor General 25 February
19992[3] and it entered into force
on 1 March 1999. The Act will be promulgated in the Canada Gazette, the
official news bulletin of the Government of Canada.
Mines Action Canada has expressed concerns about two aspects of the Bill C-22
and the Mine Ban Treaty. They are presented here in order to spur further
discussion and examination. First, in Bill C-22 the terms “anti-personnel
mine” and “mine” are defined by use of the phrase
“designed, altered or
intended.”2[4]In
the Mine Ban Treaty the same terms are defined by use of the word
“designed” only and make no reference to the phrase “altered
or intended.”2[5] Second,
Bill C-22 contains a more narrow definition of the treaty’s prohibition on
assistance. C-22 states that participation in operations with a State not
party to the Mine Ban Treaty is allowed “if that participation does not
amount to active assistance in that prohibited
activity."2[6] (Emphasis
added).
CCW and CD
Canada signed the original Protocol II of the CCW in 1981, and ratified it in
1994. The revised Protocol II of the CCW was ratified 5 January 1998. The
Declaration submitted by Canada to the CCW and its original Protocol II is
available on the UN web site.2[7]
For amended Protocol II, “Canada reserves the right to transfer and use a
small number of mines prohibited under this Protocol to be used exclusively for
training and testing purposes.” Canada also issued these
understandings:
1. “It is understood that the provisions of Amended Protocol II
shall, as the context requires, be observed at all times.
2. It is understood that the word “primarily” is included in
Article 2, paragraph 3 of Amended Protocol II to clarify that mines designed to
be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to
that of a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not
considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so
equipped.”2[8]
In 1998 Canada did not veto the appointment, in the UN Conference on
Disarmament (CD), of a special coordinator to explore the possibility of
negotiations in the CD of a ban on APM transfers, nor did it actively support
the appointment. In January 1999 Canada stated that it would not oppose the
re-appointment of a coordinator. While the Canadian position appears to be one
of non-interference, Canada will not support any work in the CD that will impair
or hamper the effectiveness of the Mine Ban Treaty. This assumption is
supported by an address made by Ambassador Mark Moher in which he states,
“If such negotiations do take place, the only standards that we will
accept are those of the Mine Ban Convention. Canada will not be a party to
moving international law
backwards.”2[9] In the
same address the Ambassador expresses the view that the CCW is a more suitable
forum than the CD for any activity outside of the Mine Ban Treaty. “In
our view, it would be more appropriate to supplement this existing instrument
than to create a new
instrument.”3[0]
Production
Canada formerly produced the “Elsie”
antipersonnel mine (models: C3/C3A1/C3A2). Production of the Elsie ceased in
1992.3[1] Parliamentary records
show no contracts beyond those signed in 1991 for the production of 100,000
Elsie mines. The mines were produced by SNC-Industrial Technologies Inc, a
subsidiary of the SNC-Lavalin group, for the Department of National Defence.
DND decided that it did not need that quantity and in a settlement with SNC
agreed to purchase 40,000, which were manufactured and delivered in
1992.3[2] Information on the
total quantities of Elsie AP mines produced in Canada has not been made
available to date.
The Elsie is a plastic-bodied, cone shaped AP mine, designed to wound or kill
by blast effect. It is one of the world’s smallest mines. The Elsie is
undetectable with conventional electro-magnetic equipment, but a detector ring
can be fitted to render the mine
detectable.3[3] The cost of the
C3A1 in 1994 was $40. These antipersonnel mines were produced by Canadian
Arsenals Ltd., a crown corporation, up until 1986, when Canadian Arsenals was
bought by the SNC-Lavalin group and later re-named SNC-Industrial Technologies
Inc. The subsidiary company continued to produce the Elsie at its ammunition
factory in Le Gardeur, Quebec.
According to the Deputy Director of the Export Controls Division of the
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada has neither
licensed production of the Elsie in another country, nor transferred AP mine
production technology to another
country.3[4] However, records
show that both the U.S. and Japan have produced “a copy of the Canadian
C3A1, or Elsie, anti-personnel mine,” the American
M253[5] and the Japanese Type
6/67.3[6]
According to Colonel Normand Levert it was not necessary to decommission the
ammunition factory,3[7] only molds
and tools related to the production of the C3 mines were
destroyed.3[8] The tools were
“destroyed by using arc-welding/shearing/crushing and/or burning under the
surveillance of a Canadian Forces Quality Assurance
Representative.”3[9]
Claymore Mines
SNC-Industrial Technologies Inc has been awarded a contract by the Department
of National Defence to assemble 18,000 modified M-18 Claymore mines
(re-classified C-19, to reflect the
modification).4[0] The C-19s are
to be assembled in command-detonate mode only from component parts that were
imported from the U.S. in the summer of
1997.4[1] The imported parts were
screened under the Canadian moratoria and were imported under an agreement that
they would not be used to produce tripwire Claymores. To ensure compliance with
the Mine Ban Treaty they are being produced without the built-in tripwire
capability.4[2] The Canadian
Forces do not consider the M18 Claymore in command-detonated mode to be a mine
as defined by the treaty, and are now referring to it as an “area defense
weapon.”4[3]
Alternatives
The Antipersonnel Mine Operational Planning and Policy Guidelines for the
Canadian Forces stated that Canada’s operational stock of antipersonnel
mines would be replaced with “...a mix of sensors, command-detonated
weapons [such as the M-18 Claymore reclassified as C19s] additional infantry,
artillery, armour and air-delivered
weapons.”4[4] According to
Major Harry Burke, Canada is not currently engaged in R&D on or the
production of alternatives to AP
mines.4[5]
However, part of the mandate of the recently created Canadian Centre for Mine
Action Technologies (CCMAT) is to investigate alternatives to AP mines,
“...to show that viable and more humane alternatives, that do not target
civilians, can be developed as a way to persuade hold-out countries to sign the
Convention.”4[6]
CCMAT’s Project Charter outlines this aspect of the center’s
mandate: “...while there is no single technology or device that provides
for a one-for-one replacement for anti-personnel mines, there may be alternative
approaches that can accomplish the anti-personnel landmine function within the
constraints of the convention in some scenarios and for some threats. The
Centre would study and document such alternative approaches and identify
technologies necessary for their
implementation.”4[7] CCMAT
plans to conduct its investigation into alternatives by acquiring, modifying
and/or developing computer models (see below) to assess alternatives to
landmines,4[8] and the development
of sensor and command and control technologies as components of alternative
systems.4[9]
Concern has been raised by Mines Action Canada about the use of the Canadian
Landmine Fund to finance research into alternatives to landmines. Despite
several requests,5[0] neither
CCMAT nor any of the Ministers responsible for allocation of the Fund have
provided Mines Action Canada with formal, written clarification of the CCMAT
research component into “more humane alternatives” to antipersonnel
landmines.
CCMAT is currently developing an operational research study in computer
modeling, to provide fact as opposed to opinion on the limited military utility
of APM use. The aim of the initiative is to run model simulations to see the
extent to which AP mines are of use in the field. This is an initiative
supported by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade,
anticipating the study can be used as proof of the minimal military utility of
AP mines, when in dialogue with non-signatories to the Mine Ban Treaty. The
initiative was launched on 23 November 1998; the rudimentary basics of the
initiative should be in place by fall
1999.5[1]
Transfer
The Government of Canada states that AP mines have
not been exported from Canada since
1987.5[2] This is substantiated
by SNC-Lavalin who claim that when their take-over of Canadian Arsenals was
made, Canadian Arsenals had received a government contract for the manufacture
of several tens of thousands of type C3A1 mines, for sale to the Government of
Kuwait.5[3] Under SNC’s
ownership this contract was completed and the mines exported at the end of
1987.5[4] Robert Racine, then
Vice-President of Public Affairs, stated that this sale, “...to our
knowledge, [was] the one and only order exported by our subsidiary
[SNC-Industrial Technologies
Inc.].”5[5]
At the time of the final Canadian export order of C3A1s, Kuwait was allied
with Iraq in the war against
Iran.5[6] Kuwait was later
invaded and occupied by Iraq in August 1990, precipitating the Gulf War of
January-February 1991.5[7]
Following the Gulf War, investigations of Iraqi arsenals found twenty-three
different types of AP mine from at least ten nations, among them C3A1s produced
by SNC-Industrial Technologies
Inc.5[8] In a 1995 letter former
minister of defense David Collenette said these mines were either legitimately
transferred from Kuwait to Iraq or Kuwaiti stockpiles were plundered during the
war.5[9] It is known the C3A1 was
also supplied to the British Armed Forces. Canadian-manufactured AP mines are
reported to have been used by U.S. and
Japan.6[0] Information on exports
to these and other countries is not available at this time.
On 17 January 1996 the Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs jointly
announced a unilateral moratorium on the export of AP
mines.6[1] With entry-into-force
of the MBT and Bill C-22 the ban on exports will no longer be at ministerial
discretion but law. The ban on exports applies to all AP mines as defined by
the treaty except those exempted by Article 3 for training purposes.
The Canadian Centre for Mine Action Technologies is currently arranging the
import of PMN2 mines from Georgia for use in testing and challenging detection
and neutralization equipment and techniques. The Centre uses live mines for
this and in mid-December 1998 was offered the mines by visiting Georgian
officials.6[2] According to an
official in DND, the department is not required to obtain import permits for
this purpose, "DND does not request permission to import foreign anti-personnel
mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or
mine destruction technique, as authorized by Art. 3 of the Convention and Bill
C-22. The quantities are minimal and DND ensures that the total number of
anti-personnel mines in its inventory remains well below
2,000."6[3]
Transit
While there is no official or stated policy on another country moving AP
mines through Canadian territory, a written response to queries made on behalf
of Landmine Monitor notes transfer (import/export) of AP mines is prohibited
under the Convention and that it does not address transit of mines.
“Transit is the movement from one part of a state’s territory to
another part of the territory of the same state. Canada has no legal obligation
to prohibit the transit of mines through our territory by other states.
However, Canada discourages
this.”6[4] Sections of the
NATO survey circulated in March 1998 addressed questions around “storage,
transit and transfer”6[5] of
AP mines. The results of the survey are unknown. In discussions with a DND
official who worked very closely on the issue, it was said that Canada would not
ask if landmines are part of NATO or allied shipments through its territory.
The distinction between transfer and transit is presumably to leave undisturbed
the right of “innocent passage,” under cover of which the U.S., for
example, might well move mines through Canada. The official said it was
unlikely the U.S. would transfer its mines by road and the logistics of checking
compliance with a prohibition on air and sea transfer are
problematic.6[6]
Stockpiling
Canada announced that it had destroyed the last of
its approximately 90,000 AP mines in November 1997. A special ceremony was held
in Ottawa 3 November 1997, attended by both the Coordinator and the Chairperson
of Mines Action Canada, Jody Williams of the ICBL, Prime Minister Jean
Chrétien, Minister Lloyd Axworthy, Defence Minister Art Eggleton, and
other officials, to blow up the remaining AP mines. Recently, the Department of
National Defence (DND) reports that tilt rod fuses were separated from all M21
anti-vehicle mines in stock and destroyed in compliance with the treaty. The
20,000 stripped M21s are scheduled for destruction in the coming year.
6[7]
Canada destroyed 63,351 C3A1s and 104 M16A1/2s in 1996. It destroyed a
further 18,004 C3A2s and 11,292 M16A1/2s in
1997.6[8] The destruction took
place between October 1996 and November
1997.6[9] In 1996, DND considered
these mines to be an obsolete technology and was planning to replace them with a
remote-delivered, self-neutralising/self-destruct system (SN/SD). The treaty
process accelerated the destruction of the AP mines and brought an end to the
SN/SD plans.7[0]
The destruction (including that of the tilt rods) was carried out at a base
in Dundurn, Saskatchewan. Three or four CF personnel put alternating layers of a
small number of the mines and expired explosive material into a pit. The mixture
was blown up and the process repeated. The cost was calculated by the CF to be
approximately $4 per mine in 1997; a total of $403,672.35 for the close to
90,000 mines.7[1]
Other Mines and Munitions
Canada has retained its Claymore mines. The 5,400 presently in stock are
American M18A1 Claymores. After conducting an inquiry, National Defence
Headquarters (NDHQ) is satisfied that the M18s now in stock do not have a
built-in tripwire capability.7[2]
To Mines Action Canada, there was lack of clarity within DND on whether the
reclassification involved modification, removal or if the tripwire capability
was ever present. An additional 18,000 C19 Claymores have been ordered without a
built-in tripwire capability and are in production at SNC-IT in Canada.
The CF also stocks the “universal booby-trap device” F1A1. In the
CF mine database, the F1A1 is listed as one of a number of devices which,
operating together, would enable the M18 to function in a tripwire mode.
Booby-trapping the C19s in this manner would now be illegal under the Canadian
interpretation of the treaty. CF also reports stocking an "anti-lift device"
based on the F1A1 switch; this device is reported to be able to function in a
pressure mode while "not in AT mine anti-lift
role."7[3]
In addition, Canada has FFV 028 self-neutralising anti-vehicle
mines.7[4] It is listed as
possessing these mines in its 1996 mine database, and is reported to have bought
an additional 12,000 from the Dutch via Bofors in a process begun in 1996 and
concluded in October 1997.7[5]
According to reports, the Dutch Ministry of Defence believed the magnetic
influence mine would not be in accordance with the Ottawa Treaty because of the
highly sensitive nature of its
sensor.7[6] Indeed, the CF 1996
database notes that "disturbance of the mine body will cause actuation." In
addition, both the CF 1996 and 1998 mine databases warn that the mine may be set
off by the metal components in a mine detector. DND confirms that the mines are
controversial and reports that its tests remain "inconclusive." DND reports
that it plans to modify the mine, replacing the current fuse with a safer
one.7[7] The DM21, a German
anti-vehicle mine also held in significant quantities in Canadian stockpiles, is
considered by DND to fall outside the treaty
prohibition.7[8]
The Canadian Air Force reports that it has no AP mines that would be
prohibited by the treaty. According to the Air Force, the munition closest to
the treaty definition in its possession is the Mark 20 Rock Eye Cluster Bomb,
designed to destroy tanks.7[9]
NDHQ has no information on the failure rates of these
munitions.8[0] DND's
"Anti-personnel Mine Operational Planning and Policy Guidelines for the Canadian
Forces", 27 June 1997, provides for, inter alia, "air-delivered weapons" to
replace AP mines prohibited by the treaty.
8[1]
APMs for Training
According to public statements of Minister of Defence Eggleton and Minister
of Foreign Affairs Axworthy, Canada has elected to keep a maximum of 2,000 AP
mines under the treaty exception for training purposes. This is not codified in
Canadian law, but appears to have taken the form of a ministerial directive.
8[2] At time of printing, there
were about 1,800 AP mines retained for training. These are broken down as
follows: 1,000 C3A2s (Canadian); 493 M16A1/2s (American "Bouncing Betties"); 49
PMA1s (former Yugoslavia); 45 PMA2s (former Yugoslavia); 57 PMA3s (former
Yugoslavia); 100 PPMI-No.1s (Czechoslovakia); 21 VS50s (Italy); 10 VAL M69s
(Italy); and 8 VS MK2s
(Italy).8[3] These numbers will
change over time as the C3A2s and M16s are used (at a projected rate of 50 per
year), and more foreign mines are imported. Mines will be obtained in this way
from Ukraine, as it destroys its stocks with Canadian assistance, and others
will be imported from Georgia. The retained mines will be used to test
countermine equipment and to teach mine-awareness to soldiers. They are stored
at the Defence Research Establishment in Suffield, Alberta; probably also at the
base near Dundurn, Saskatchewan and another Defence Research Establishment at
Valcartier, near Montréal,
Québec.8[4]
Use
There has been no evidence of the use of AP mines
in Canada (other than for officially sanctioned purposes of military training
and research and development). However, concerns were expressed when on 11
September 1995, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) used a remote-detonated
munition concealed below the surface of a gravel road to disable a moving
vehicle.8[5] These actions by the
RCMP occurred during the Gustafsen Lake standoff, a tense 31-day dispute over
the occupation of land near Gustafsen Lake, British Columbia, by the First
Nations’ indigenous people, the Shuswap. Critics of the RCMP’s
tactic described the remote-detonated munition as an “improvised
landmine.”8[6]
Canada began funding mine awareness training in 1989-90 when the Canadian
Forces provided training for Afghan refugees in
Pakistan.8[8] The Department of
National Defence has been funding mine clearance programs since 1992 (Iraq &
Kuwait).8[9] The Canadian
International Development Agency (CIDA), the agency responsible for delivering
Canada's official development assistance program has supported mine clearance
since 1993 when it disbursed more than $2 million to Afghanistan, Angola,
Cambodia, Laos and El
Salvador.9[0]
Until 1998 Canadian support for mine action programs was largely channelled
through either CIDA or the DND as
follows:9[1]
Year
DND
CIDA
1989
2,500,000
--
1993
900,000
2,455,344
1994
700,000
3,690,149
1995
700,000
1,490,235
1996
712,000
5,276,161
1997
715,000
3,860,363
Totals
6,227,000
12,772,252
CIDA has provided funding to United Nation agencies, the Red Cross and
Canadian NGOs.9[2] Other
countries receiving mine action funding from Canada have included Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Somalia.
Canadian Landmine Fund
A significant increase in Canadian funding for mine action has evolved with
Canada’s change of policy and subsequent support for the global
anti-landmine movement. On 3 December 1997 at the MBT signing in Ottawa, Prime
Minister Chrétien announced the establishment of a $100 million fund to
implement the treaty. “This means bringing it to life; making it truly
global; clearing the mines; helping the victims. Both with immediate medical
care and long-term help rebuilding their
lives."9[3]
The announced fund evolved into the Canadian Landmine Fund (CLF) involving
four Canadian federal government departments each mandated with different
responsibilities. The Canadian International Development Agency is responsible
for mine clearance, mine awareness and victim assistance. The Department of
Foreign Affairs and International Trade is responsible for overall
coordination, treaty universalization, ratification, monitoring, sustainability
and Canadian public awareness. DFAIT and the Department of National Defence
jointly are responsible for stockpile destruction. DND and Industry Canada
jointly manage the newly created Canadian Centre for Mine Action Technologies.
Within CCMAT, Defence has the responsibility for technology research and
development, and Industry Canada the responsibility for the commercialization
and marketing of any new technology.
Government strategy has been to maximize its contributions through
partnerships with other governments (for example, Norway, Israel, Jordan, and
Mexico) as well as with the private sector (for example, Canadian AutoWorkers
Union – Social Justice Fund). The Canadian government’s approach
has also included NGO partnerships with particular involvement of Mines Action
Canada (MAC). MAC is working jointly with the Canadian Red Cross and DFAIT on
an outreach and sustainability program focused on Canadian students and youth.
The Youth Mine Action Ambassadors Programme (YMAA) involves five youth interns
working within host NGOs (UNICEF, Red Cross, MAC and MAG Canada) to raise public
awareness, to build public support for mine action and to raise funds. These
goals are met through organized events in schools, colleges and universities, as
well as, various activities with the general public. In 1998 MAC and DFAIT
created the Canadian Landmine Action Fund as another mechanism through which
Canadians can financially contribute. Joint fundraising initiatives such as this
are rare in Canada and are an attempt by both partners to develop additional and
sustainable long term funding for NGO victim assistance and mine clearance
programs.
The traditional funding agency for overseas assistance has been CIDA. In the
latter part of 1998 CIDA created the Tapping Creativity Fund, to be accessed by
Canadian NGOs working in the areas of mine awareness, mine clearance and victim
assistance. The fund represents a very small portion of funds designated to
CIDA for mine action. Although the fund has a much quicker review and approval
process than normal, each project is limited to only a $200,000 contribution.
Currently the fund is limited to $2 million for fiscal year 1998-99 only. As of
1 March 1999 almost $1.8 million of this fund had been allocated to 11 NGOs
(included in the list below) for awareness, clearance and victim assistance
programs in nine different countries.
Two representatives of Mines Action Canada are members of the Project Review
Committee and provide NGO perspective and analysis to the decision-making
process. MAC has been informed verbally that the fund has been extended and
that multi-year funding will also be made available through it. It is hoped
that both the sizes of the fund and the project limit will be raised
significantly. NGOs are also able to compete with commercial firms and other
organizations for tendered projects or through normal CIDA channels, which may
not be as flexible or accessible.
MAC has also been invited to participate in the CCMAT. For the moment MAC
participates as an observer in order to bring NGO expertise, perspectives and
concerns to the Centre’s work. MAC is waiting clarification on the exact
nature of the research into the alternatives component of the CCMAT charter
before officially joining the governance of the
CCMAT.9[4]
Since the announcement of the Canadian Landmine Fund allocations have been
made to a wide variety of actors including multilateral agencies such as PAHO
and OAS (Central America); UNMAS (Kosovo, Yemen), UN Mine Action Centres
(Croatia, Chad); and UNDP (Mozambique). Through bilateral programs it has funded
mine action in Bosnia, Burkina Faso, Georgia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
India, Jordan, Lebanon, Russia, Thailand, and Ukraine.
DFAIT has contributed significantly to the ICBL, its Landmine Monitor
initiative, and to Mines Action Canada, the Canadian component of the ICBL.
Among the other NGOs receiving Canadian government funding are UNICEF/Canada,
COCAMO, Sierra Club of B.C, World Vision Canada, Council of Canadians with
Disabilities, Disabled People's International, Canadian Network for
International Surgery, ADRA Canada, Alternatives, Handicap International, MAG
Canada, C.I.D.C., and Queen's
University.9[5]
Funding can be broken into two components: domestic and foreign. In the
first year, domestic expenditures
include:9[6]
Not all of the funding listed above will be spent solely in Canada. CCMAT
will undertake field testing and international co-operation activities.
MAC’s funding will support several international activities. However, for
the purposes of this report they are being reported under domestic funding. The
proportion of the CLF set aside for research and development of new appropriate
mine action technologies by the Canadian Centre for Mine Action Technologies is
currently the largest single allocation from the CLF, a fact that is unlikely to
change.
Canadian funds destined for use outside of Canada include those given to
Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, El
Salvador, Honduras, Iraq, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Jordan, Kosovo, Laos, Mexico
(international conference), Mozambique, Southern Africa Region, Uganda, Yemen
and Zimbabwe.9[9]
Total funds committed from the Canadian Landmine Fund for clearance,
surveying, awareness and victim assistance thus far are $28.16 million. Three
major programs to be implemented over five years, 1998 through 2002, have been
funded in:
Additional funds were given to support international coordination (UNMAS,
multilateral coordination, $500,000); universalization (advocacy, outreach and
experts meetings, $245,000 for events held in Burkina Faso, Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, Georgia, India, Jordan, Lebanon, Russia, Thailand, Ukraine);
advocacy (ICBL, international NGO activities, $300,000); and monitoring,
compliance and evaluation for a total of $580,000 (Landmine Monitor, research,
monitoring and reporting, $450,000; Handicap International, technical magazine
on best practices, $10,000; IDRC, tools to monitor mine action progress,
$120,000).
Clearance and Casualties
Canada is not a mine-affected nation in the
conventional sense, but it does have areas of mine/UXO-contaminated land. These
areas tend to be former or active Canadian Force Bases, used as practice or
training ranges. The decommissioning of military land has generated extensive
range clearance work for demining/UXO clearance companies in Canada. The
following companies are the main ones conducting survey/clearance work in
Canada: Notra Environmental Services Inc, SNC-Lavalin and Wolf’s Flat
Ordnance Disposal Corporation.
The decontamination work that SNC-Lavalin has carried out so far has been at
the ammunition disposal site, and other redundant sites. Le Gardeur, an
ammunition facility outside of Québec City belonging to SNC-Lavalin, was
closed down 3-4 years ago and is now in the initial stages of being
decommissioned, with preliminary decontamination work (mainly on contaminated
soils) being carried out by
SNC-Lavalin.10[2]
The majority of Canadians injured or killed by landmines are members of the
Canadian Forces active in peacekeeping duties. Between December 1992 and
December 1995 more than 44 incidents involving either antipersonnel or antitank
mines were recorded in the Defense Department's Mine Clearance Operations
Evaluation study. The study was completed in January 1996 and covers only
operations in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and in Somalia. In total 32
injuries and 2 fatalities were
recorded.10[3] Twenty-four of
the incidents recorded did not result in any injuries at
all.10[4] At the time of this
writing the total number of deaths and injuries to Canadian Forces personnel
attributable to landmines is not known. Benefits guaranteed by law to persons
with disabilities include health and medical care, training, rehabilitation and
counseling, employment and participation in decisions affecting
themselves.10[5]
[1]Throughout the report,
figures given are in Canadian dollars.
[2] Canada did not opt for
formal provisional application of Article 18 of the treaty, which binds a
signatory to key prohibitions even prior to entry-into-force.
[3]Government of Canada, News
Release No.5, 17 January 1996 on the announcement of a comprehensive, unilateral
moratoria on the production, export and operational use of AP mines by
Canada
[4] For a detailed description
of Canada’s role in the Ottawa Process, see M. Cameron, et al, eds.,
To Walk Without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines (Toronto
:Oxford University Press, 1998).
[5]OAS, Register on
Antipersonnel Landmines, OEA/Ser.G, CP/CSH-168-99, 11 February 1999
[6]DFAIT, press release No.
129, “Axworthy Appoints Ambassador for Mine Action,” 22 May 1998,
Ottawa.
[7]DFAIT, press release No.212,
“Canada to Support International Mine Monitoring Program,” 15
September 1998, Ottawa
[8]Canada-Norway Partnership
for Action, The LYSOEN Declaration, 11 May 1998, Bergen, Norway.
[9]Canada-EU Statement on Small
Arms and Antipersonnel Mines, 17 December 1998, Brussels.
1[0]ILX-DFAIT, “One Year
Later: Is the Ottawa Convention Making A Difference? 2 December 1998,
Ottawa.
1[8]DND, Antipersonnel Mine
Operational Planning and Policy Guidelines for the Canadian Forces, 27 June
1997, as quoted in Fredenburg, "The Banning of the Antipersonnel Landmine,"
p.7
1[9]Discussions, Canadian
Forces Technical Advisor with Canadian Head of Delegation, 1 September 1997, as
footnoted in Fredenburg, "The Banning of the Antipersonnel Landmine," p.9
2[0]First Session, Thirty-sixth
Parliament, 46 Elizabeth II, 1997, Statutes of Canada, Chapter 33, An Act to
Implement the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production
and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on their Destruction, Bill C-22,
Assented to 27 November 1997, section 6(3)(d)
2[1]Discussion, ABCANZ Military
Advisors, Oslo Diplomatic Conference, attended by the author, 8-10 September
1997, as footnoted in Fredenburg, "The Banning of the Antipersonnel Landmine,"
p.9
[2]2Statutes of Canada, Chapter
33, An Act to Implement the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use...,
www.parl.gc.ca/36/1/parlbus/chambus/house/bills/government/C-22/.../C-22_cover-E.htm
2[4]First Session, Thirty-sixth
Parliament, 46 Elizabeth II, 1997, Statutes of Canada, Chapter 33, An Act to
Implement the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production
and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on their Destruction, Bill C-22,
Assented to 27 November 1997, section 2
2[5]UN Convention on the
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel
Mines and on their Destruction, Concluded at Oslo 18 September 1997,
C.N.473.1997.TREATIES-2, Article 1
2[6]Statutes of Canada, Chapter
33, An Act to Implement the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use..., section
6(3)(d)
2[7]UN Treaty Series, vol.
1342, p.137, depositary notifications C.N.356.1981, TREATIES-7, 14 January 1982
and C.N. 320.1982 TREATIES-11, 21 June 1983.
3[1]Government news release,
No.5, on the announcement of comprehensive, unilateral moratoria on the
production, export and operational use of AP mines by Canada, 17 January 1996.
Other sources indicate production halted in 1994. See, Mark Abley, The
Gazette, Montreal, 17 November 1994; Jane’s Military Vehicles and
Logistics, 1994-95, p 175.
3[2]Government news release,
No.5, 17 January 1996.
U.S. Department of State web site:
http://mineweb.org/mfacts/mfacts5/f573a.html; and SNC Industrial Technologies
Inc, The Convention on Conventional Weapons: Final Report on a Study of the
Technological and Cost Implications of Retrofitting Landmines with Fuses
Incorporating Self Destruct or Self Neutralizing Devices, December 1994.
3[4]MAC/Roger Lucy (Deputy
Director of Export Controls Division), telephone interview, 11 February
1999.
3[5]U.S. Department of State:
http://mineweb.org/mfacts/mfacts7/f751a.html
3[6]U.S. Department of State:
http://mineweb.org/mfacts/mfacts5/f534a.html
3[7]MAC/Col. Normand Levert,
(Liaison Officer to the Mine Action Team of the Department of Foreign Affairs
and International Trade), telephone interview, 23 February 1999.
3[8]Directorate of Arms and
Proliferation Control Policy, documentary evidence of the destruction of APM
tooling pieces, completed on 30 November 1998, provided to MAC by LCol. J. P.
Chabot.
4[0]MAC/Col. Normand Levert
(Liaison Officer to the Mine Action Team of the Department of Foreign Affairs
and International Trade), telephone interview, 5 February 1999.
4[2]MAC/Col. Normand Levert
(Liaison Officer to the Mine Action Team of the Department of Foreign Affairs
and International Trade), telephone interview, 5 February 1999.
[4]4Major Paul W. Fredenburg,
“The Banning of the Antipersonnel Landmine”, Canadian Defense
Quarterly, Winter 1997, p 7.
4[5]MAC/Major Harry Burke
(Deputy Scientific Advisor [Land], Research and Development Branch, Department
of National Defense), telephone interview, 4 February 1999.
4[6]Government Press Release,
on the launch of CCMAT, 25 August 1999.
5[0]MAC, letter to ministers of
foreign affairs, defense, international cooperation and industry, copied to
CCMAT director, 29 January 1999
5[1]MAC/Major Harry Burke
(Deputy Scientific Advisor [Land], Research and Development Branch, Department
of National Defense), telephone interview, 4 February 1999.
5[2]Government News Release,
No. 5, on the announcement of comprehensive, unilateral moratoria on the
production, export and operational use of APMs by Canada, 17 January 1996.
5[3]Letter from Robert Racine,
then vice-president, Public Affairs, SNC-Lavalin, to Dr. Eric Notebaert and Dr.
Michael Dworkind of Health Professionals for Nuclear Responsibility, 17 November
1994.
5[6]François Patenaud,
“La belle hypocrisie de SNC-Lavalin et de son pape Guy
Saint-Pierre”, L’aut Journal, No. 144, 20 November - 11 December
1995.
5[7]Ed. Michael Howard and Wm.
Roger Louis, The Oxford History of the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1998), p 260.
5[8]U.S. Army Intelligence
Agency, U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center, "Operation Desert
Shield Special Report: Iraqi Combat Engineer Capabilities,” 30 November
1990, pp. 2-16, 2-17.
5[9]DND, letter to MP Svend
Robinson, signed by former Minister of Defense, David Collenette, March
1995.
6[1]Government of Canada, News
Release No.5, 17 January 1996, on the announcement of comprehensive, unilateral
moratoria on the production, export and operational use of AP mines by
Canada
6[2]ILX-DFAIT, Normand Levert,
e-mail subject "ILX 1025", 8 January 1999
6[3]Directorate of Arms and
Proliferation Control Policy, Lt.Col. J.P Chabot, Ottawa, 23 February 1999
6[4]Kristeva Zoe, Political and
Multilateral Issues, DFAIT-ILX, facsimile, 11 February 1999
6[5]NATO Headquarters,
Brussels, Ref. A. IMSWM-121-98 (SD2), 17 March 1998
[6]6Colonel Ed Fitch, Director
of Military Engineering, DND, telephone interview, 5 May 1998, Ottawa
6[7]MAC/Col. Normand Levert,
DFAIT Liaison Officer, National Defense Headquarters, telephone interviews, 5, 8
and 23 February 1999; letter from Daniel Longtin, Director of Munition
Programme, National Defense Headquarters (NDHQ), 12 March 1999
6[8]Directorate of Arms and
Proliferation Control Policy, National Defense Headquarters, faxed information,
18 Feb 1999
6[9]"Canada announces timetable
for destruction of Landmines," Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade Press Release, No. 145, 10 September 1997
7[0]Fredenburg, "The banning
..., "Canadian Defense Quarterly, p. 6.
7[1]MAC/Col. Levert, telephone
interview, September 1998.
8[7]All
figures in this report are in Canadian dollars. As of 25 February 1999 the
exchange rate was 1C$ = .66 US$.
[8]8"One Year Later: Is the
Ottawa Convention Making A Difference, Report submitted to the Canadian
Parliament by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dec. 2, 1998. Pg. 5
9[1]Information provided by
DFAIT to LM questionnaire, Feb. 1999
9[2]Speech made by Minister
of International Cooperation, Diane Marleau, Ottawa, 2 December 1997
9[3]Speech made by Prime
Minister Jean Chrétien to the Opening Plenary of the Ottawa Treaty
Signing Conference, 3 December 1997
9[4] In a Feb. 1999 meeting
government officials informed MAC that the total allocation for the
‘research into humane alternatives’ would be up to $1.5 million over
the five year mandate of CCMAT.
9[5]Funding for ADRA Canada
(Yemen), Alternatives (Yemen) and UNICEF Canada (Angola) were approved in
1999.
9[6]Government of Canada
fiscal year runs from 1 April to 31 March.
9[7]This five-year
initiative has a total of $17 million in funding. Notional expenditures by
financial year are 1,445,000 (98/99), 5,640,000 (99/00), 4,205,000 (00/01),
3,405,000 (01/02) and 2,305,000. Government officials provided these figures in
an Aug. 1998 briefing to MAC from DFAIT, DND and Industry Canada.
9[8]The funding to MAC
supports both its domestic and international work.
[9]9The figures used in this
report are compiled from the One Year Later report prepared by DFAIT and
released on 2 December 1998. The figures are also taken from MAC files and a
February 1999 response from DFAIT to a LM questionnaire.
10[2]MAC/Rèmi
Vèzina (Manager of SNC-Lavalin’s Decontamination Department),
telephone interview, 5 February 1999.
10[3]The incidents were
categorized in the report as 16 slight injuries, 16 serious injuries and 2
fatalities.
10[4]"The Canadian Battle
Group in Somalia operated in wheeled armored vehicles. The shape and character
of these vehicles give them an inherent mine resistance. Hence no injuries,"
noted on report by L.Col Normand Levert, DND, copy faxed 10 February 1999.
10[5]Canadian submission to
the United Nations global Survey on Disability Policy, 15 September 1996,
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