Sudan

Background

Following a three-year peace process, the Government of Sudan and the southern-based rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 9 January 2005. An interim implementation period of six years will last until July 2011, when a referendum on self-determination for the south will be held. Sudan is now ruled by the Government of National Unity (GONU)—an entity containing the former ruling party, the National Congress, SPLM/A and others—and a semi-autonomous Government of South Sudan (GOSS). On 24 March 2005 the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1590 to monitor implementation of the CPA and establish a peacekeeping mission, the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS).

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of the Sudan signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 13 October 2003. The treaty entered into force for Sudan on 1 April 2004. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement incorporates previous agreements between the government and SPLM/A that explicitly prohibit use of all landmines. An agreement reached on 31 December 2004 states that the “laying of mines, explosive devices or booby traps of whatever type shall be prohibited.”^[1]

In May 2006 factions of the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) entered into the Darfur Peace Agreement with the government of Sudan. Under Article 24, “laying of mines” is specified as a prohibited act and obligates some cooperation on mine action.^[2]

At the official launch of the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) in March 2006, GONU President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir reaffirmed that Sudan is committed and determined to achieve a complete and comprehensive ban on antipersonnel mines, including the establishment of the necessary legislative and institutional frameworks to do so.^[3] However, Sudan has yet to adopt national legal measures to ensure implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty and to enforce antipersonnel mine prohibitions.^[4]

As of mid-August 2007 Sudan had not submitted its 2007 annual Article 7 transparency report. It has submitted three previous reports.^[5]

During the Seventh Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2006, Sudan was named co-chair (with Austria) of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration. It had served as co-rapporteur of the committee since December 2005. Director of National Mine Action Center Al Awad Al Bashir Ali led Sudan’s delegation to the Seventh Meeting of States Parties. Sudan made statements with regard to the country’s progress with mine clearance, victim assistance and stockpile destruction.

Sudan participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2006 and April 2007. During the April meeting, Geneva-based Sudanese diplomat Rahma Salih Elobied served as co-chair of the victim assistance Standing Committee. Sudan made statements on stockpile destruction, victim assistance and progress toward meeting Sudan’s 2014 mine clearance deadline.

Production, Transfer and Use

Sudan has repeatedly stated that it has not produced or exported antipersonnel mines.^[6] Landmine Monitor has not received any serious allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by government, Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) or other forces anywhere in Sudan since early 2004.^[7] The Communiqué of the Sixth Meeting of the Darfur Peace Agreement Joint Commission in May 2007 made no mention of the use of antipersonnel mines by any of the parties committed to the peace agreement.

Stockpiling and Destruction

In its February 2006 Article 7 report, Sudan declared a total of 14,485 antipersonnel mines of eight types held in the stockpiles of the army and the SPLA. This included the 9,485 mines listed in Sudan’s initial Article 7 report, under the control of GONU (Soviet PMN, POMZ-2 and PMD-6, Italian TS-50, Chinese Type 72A and Indian M14), plus 5,000 mines in the GOSS (SPLA) stockpile (Chinese Type 72A, Indian M14, Soviet POMZ-2, Israeli No.4 and Belgian PRB M35).^[8]

However, the February 2006 report also indicated that GONU and GOSS would each retain 5,000 mines for training purposes. Thus the May 2006 Article 7 report subsequently listed a stockpile of 4,485 GONU antipersonnel mines (same types as before), but no stocks under the control of GOSS.^[9]

Sudan’s treaty-mandated deadline for stockpile destruction is 1 April 2008. On 30 April 2007, the NMAA hosted an event in which the first destruction of stockpiled mines took place. Members of the NMAA, GONU government ministers, foreign diplomats, UN officials, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the media were in attendance.^[10]

A total of 4,488 antipersonnel mines were destroyed. The total destroyed exceeded by three the number of mines Sudan declared to have in stock in its May 2006 Article 7 report. Sudan did not, however, indicate that its stockpile destruction is complete, but rather affirmed that it will destroy its remaining antipersonnel mines well before the deadline.^[11] On 24 April 2006 Sudan said that the 4,488 mines to be destroyed would constitute 48 percent of its stock.^[12]

The UN Development Programme (UNDP) produced a chart of the mines destroyed. The origin, types and numbers of mines do not match Sudan’s Article 7 reports, and the nomenclature used for many of the mines does not correspond to standard designations.

It is not clear if the “Number Remaining” column indicates mines remaining to be destroyed, or mines that will be retained for training purposes.

The October 2004 and February 2006 Article 7 reports stated that 5,000 mines of various types would be retained for training purposes by the Engineer Corps of the Sudan Armed Forces.^[14] The May 2006 report stated that in addition to the 5,000 mines to be retained by the Sudan Armed Forces, all of the 5,000 mines identified as held by Government of South Sudan People’s Army would be retained by its Engineer Corps. No information on the types of mines retained is provided.^[15]

This combined total of 10,000 retained is among the highest kept by any State Party. Sudan has not reported in any detail on the intended purposes or actual uses of its retained mines, as agreed by States Parties at the First Review Conference in November-December 2004.

Landmine and ERW Problem

The extensive contamination of Sudan by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) resulted from two major periods of conflict. More than 20 years of armed struggle between government forces and rebel groups―mainly the SPLA―in the south of the country ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on 9 January 2005. Antivehicle mines were emplaced on roads by the SPLA to restrict movement of forces of the former Government of Sudan and access to towns they controlled, while the government forces used antipersonnel mines defensively to protect its garrison towns and prohibit movement of insurgent troops.^[16]

Estimates of the extent of contamination vary greatly. In 2005 the UN and national authorities claimed that mines or ERW affect, to some extent, a third of the country, with the vast majority located in southern and central Sudan.^[17] In contrast, the United Nations Mine Action Office’s (UNMAO) Deputy Programme Manager told Landmine Monitor in March 2006 that unexploded ordnance (UXO) is a problem but “mines are not a problem in Sudan, except in areas where fighting was more intense and locations where the population is exercising a pressure on the land, such as Kassala, Malakal, or the Nuba Mountains.”^[18] In mid-2007, an UNMAO official stated that the presence and perceived presence of mines and ERW in livelihood areas continue to pose a problem in Sudan. While the total area of recorded dangerous areas in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) is more than 10,600 square kilometers, including roads, the actual size of contaminated or suspected areas remains unknown.^[19]

In July 2007 the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported that mines or ERW may affect 21 of Sudan’s 25 states. UNMIS data mapping in January 2007 showed 19 states with known or suspected dangerous areas, including active war zones with suspected mine/ERW contamination.^[20] Sudan’s borders with Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya and Uganda are all considered mine-affected, with some mines having been laid as long ago as World War II.^[21]

Of dangerous areas identified as of March 2007, 40 percent were suspected minefields and 43 percent were UXO sites. In addition, some 2,800 kilometers of road were suspected to be affected by mines or ERW, a massive reduction (due largely to most of 10,864 kilometers of roads being assessed as “no Evidence of mines/UXO”) from the previous estimate of more than 11,000 kilometers.^[22]

In Darfur, government and government-backed “Janjaweed” forces have been in conflict with rebel groups since 2003, and this has continued despite the Darfur Peace Agreement in 2006.^[23] Contamination from the conflict is not yet fully understood, but it is believed to have created a scattered ERW problem comprising both UXO and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO).^[24] In June 2006 the UN Secretary-General reported the landmine threat in Darfur as low, but noted that mines may exist.^[25] In September 2006 the UNMAO Western Regional Mine Action Office reported that “large swathes of land [in Darfur] are not contaminated, but there is a still a perceived threat of mine contamination (which still hampers humanitarian aid relief), and a very real threat of ERW contamination.”^[26] In mid-2007 UNMAO reported that there were suspected mine and UXO contaminated areas in Darfur.^[27]

The Impact of Mines and ERW

Comprehensive analysis of the socioeconomic impact of mines and ERW in Sudan has not been carried out.^[28] However, a Landmine Survey of Eastern Equatoria and Blue Nile state highlighted the impact in those states. In Eastern Equatoria the number of communities impacted by economic blockages were: rain-fed cropland (32), pasture (31), water (16), non-cultivated (32), housing (25), roads (20) and other infrastructure (4).^[29] In the Blue Nile state, communities were impacted by economic blockages to roads, rain-fed cropland, pasture, water sources, non-agricultural land and housing.^[30]

Mines and ERW continued to have an impact on the delivery of aid and the implementation of security and development projects, as confirmed by UN agencies in April 2007.^[31] Where mine/ERW contamination necessitated the distribution of aid by air, the World Food Programme estimated that it cost four times as much.^[32] In September 2006 the UN Secretary-General declared that mines and UXO continued to pose a “major threat” to UN staff and humanitarian personnel.^[33]

Large numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) remained at risk from mines and ERW. In January 2007 there were an estimated 5.7 million IDPs in Sudan, as well as 234,000 Sudanese refugees in Chad, 350,000 refugees in other neighboring and regional states, and 170,000 refugees from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, DRC and other states sheltering in Sudan.^[34] In Eastern Equatoria alone an estimated 37,000 people had been displaced from their villages by mines and ERW.^[35] In 2006 and early 2007 the UN and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) supported the organized return of more than 36,000 IDPs and refugees. The organized return of 198,000 IDPs and 102,000 refugees was planned by the end of 2007.^[36]

Mine Action Program

Coordination and management of mine action are carried out by the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and the Southern Sudan Demining Commission (SSDC, also referred to as the Southern Sudan Demining Authority, SSDA). Both entities are assisted by the UN Mine Action Office. The NMAA, launched in March 2006, includes the National Mine Action Committee (NMAC), the National Mine Action Center based in Khartoum and the Southern Sudan Regional Mine Action Center based in Juba.^[37] According to Presidential Decree, the SSDA is meant to report to the NMAC; disagreement between the bodies continued unresolved in 2007.^[38]

UNMAO planned to continue providing training and other support to the NMAA and the mine action centers until the end of the CPA’s six-year interim period, 2011, and by then to have handed over all functions needed for the mine action program.^[39]

As of March 2007, the NMAC and SSDA headquarters were equipped, staffed and operational, following international funding and support from UNDP. Establishment of six field offices expected by the end of December 2006 was delayed until June 2007 by funding delays; it is not known if this had taken place as of June 2007. Additional field offices were planned for 2007-2008, depending on funding.^[40]

There was no comprehensive national mine action legislation in Sudan as of early 2007, but UNMAO reported that legislation was being drafted.^[41] In 2006 the legislative framework for mine action was provided by the CPA, the Darfur Peace Agreement, presidential decrees setting up the NMAA and SSDA, UNMIS mandate for mine action and the National Mine Action Policy Framework and Mine Action Strategic Framework.^[42]

UNMAO has developed the Sudanese Technical Standards and Guidelines which cover demining, mine risk education and information management.^[43] The NMAA was tasked with developing and implementing national mine action standards in line with International Mine Action Standards, which was ongoing in 2007.

Strategic Mine Action Planning

The revised National Mine Action Policy Framework and Mine Action Strategic Framework, for 2006-2011, were adopted in August 2006. The strategic goals for mine action include: continued emergency mine/ERW clearance and survey in high priority areas; mapping of suspected hazardous areas; strengthening national mine action institutions; expanding national mine action operational capacities; national mine action planning and budgeting; mobilizing national and international funding; planning and implementing the transition of mine action management from the UN to national authorities; integration of mine action into national recovery and development plans; ensuring that Sudan honors its obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty and other relevant treaties. The framework also calls for state-wide landmine impact surveys to be completed by the end of 2008.^[44]

Activities planned for 2007 included the transition plan, establishing sub-offices in six locations, integrating (“mainstreaming”) mine action, deploying recently trained national mine/UXO clearance capacity, and emergency survey, marking and clearance (survey of 9,956 kilometers of high priority routes and verification of 595 dangerous area reports).^[45]

Integration of Mine Action in Development and Reconstruction

Despite this being one of Sudan’s strategic goals, there is little evidence of mine action being integrated into national reconstruction and development plans and activities; providing assistance in this objective is one of UNDP’s goals.^[46] In July 2006 the UN Deputy Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for southern Sudan reported that “the UN agencies in particular and certain NGOs are focusing more on systems that will support the more rural areas,” with the main effort being road repair and demining to improve commerce and transport.^[47] UN interventions in 2007, including mine action, were intended to concentrate on strengthening the intra-regional transport sector, to decrease transportation time and support transport of more goods by road instead of by air.^[48]

Demining

In 2006 the National Mine Action Program in Sudan demined more than 7.7 square kilometers of mined and battle areas; it further assessed 7,010 kilometers of roads of which it demined 814 kilometers. This included the opening of a number of major routes.^[49] By June 2006 a continuous route between Khartoum and the Ugandan border had been opened (including, in some sections, an eight meter-wide emergency lane).^[50] In the first quarter of 2007, the UN reported clearance of 3,261,542 square meters, assessment of 4,075 kilometers of road, and the destruction of 658 antipersonnel mines, 532 antivehicle mines and 86,195 UXO.^[51]

However, several operators and UN agencies reported that funding delays and shortfalls, and increased insecurity, had adversely affected operations in 2006-2007. In August 2006 the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) was reported to have ambushed a team from the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action near Juba, killing two deminers; as a result, RONCO suspended a field site and withdrew to its camp at Juba until the situation stabilized.^[52] In March 2007 Norwegian People’s Aid reported that security in Western Equatoria was affected by the LRA, which then moved towards the border with the Central African Republic, affecting NGOs working in that area.^[53] In late 2006 fighting in Malakal led to the suspension and relocation of demining tasks, while insecurity in Darfur was reported to be “heavily curtailing” demining activities. In November 2006 lack of protection for operators was highlighted as impacting mine action in Juba.^[54] In January 2007 an Indian peacekeeper in southern Sudan was killed and two others wounded while escorting a mine clearance team near the town of Magwe.^[55] In May 2007 the UN reported that “Security remains a challenge to demining operations…. Planned deployments in Darfur continue to be aborted due to the on-going deterioration of the security situation and restrictions on movement.”^[56]

A wide range of military and civilian demining operators were operational in Sudan in 2006 and early 2007, including a national humanitarian demining contingent, five military demining companies (from Bangladesh, Cambodia, Egypt, Kenya and Pakistan), seven international NGOs (DanChurchAid, Danish Demining Group, HALO Trust, Norwegian People’s Aid, Mines Advisory Group, Landmine Action and the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action), at least seven national mine action NGOs (Friends of Peace and Development Organization, Sudanese Association for Combating Landmines, Nuba Mountain Mine Action Sudan, Operation Save Innocent Lives, Sudan Integrated Mine Action Service, Sudanese Landmine Information and Response Initiative and the Sudan Landmine Response), and three commercial demining companies (Development Initiative, Mechem and RONCO).

The national demining contingent, made up of former soldiers from the two main warring factions, was established in 2006 and deployed under the authority of the NMAC and SSDA. It includes 133 deminers trained and equipped by the Kenya-based International Mine Action Centre in May-June 2006 with funding from the UK. After several months delay, some 110 deminers and management staff underwent refresher training in Khartoum before clearance operations starting in March 2007 in three locations on the Babanusa-Wau railway line.^[57] Completion of this project was scheduled for June 2007, after which the contingent would work on other high priority projects. UNDP provided technical support in developing the national demining contingent, and reported in May 2007 that demining operations had allowed reconstruction of the railway line to start.^[58]

In 2006 the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations conducted an evaluation of the five military demining companies tasked by UNMIS; recommendations were due to be released in 2007.^[59]

UNDP restructured its mine action team in early 2006, replacing two international program officers with two national staff (based at the NMAC in Khartoum and South Sudan Regional Mine Action Center in Juba) to support technical advisors.^[60]

In 2006 DanChurchAid’s mine action program experienced problems, partly due to the inability to get visas for international staff. As a result, its demining and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) components were unproductive after the rainy season (mid-October 2006 to March 2007). In late 2006 DanChurchAid canceled its mine clearance program to focus on EOD and battle area clearance.^[61]

The HALO Trust has operated in partnership with the national NGO Sudan Landmine Response (SLR) in southern Sudan since June 2005. EOD and battle area clearance were ongoing in 2006, and capacity was expanded in June 2006 with US and UK funding.^[62] However, major disputes between HALO and SLR and between HALO and the SSDA, led to termination of the partnership and departure of HALO’s international personnel from Sudan in early 2007.^[63] On 22 October 2006 four major donors (the European Commission, Netherlands, UK and US) wrote to the President of the Government of South Sudan expressing concern about the SSDA’s termination of HALO’s operations.^[64] According to HALO, the President did not respond directly to the letter. Authority over equipment donated to the partnership by international donors became a major point of dispute, which remained unresolved in May 2007. HALO reported that the partnership had accomplished too little survey and clearance in 2006 to report.^[65]

Landmine Action was active in Sudan from 2002 until August 2006, in partnership with Sudanese Landmine Information and Response Initiative (SLIRI, renamed Sudan Landmine Action and Development Organization, SLADO, in May 2006). From August 2005 to August 2006 the two organizations carried out integrated survey and mine clearance/EOD.^[66]

Mines Advisory Group (MAG) expanded its operations during 2006, with 10 teams in four operational areas. In two of the locations, MAG prepared and verified land for manual clearance. MAG completed Landmine Impact Survey field work in Eastern Equatoria in July 2006, and began field work in Blue Nile state in September 2006, releasing preliminary results in March 2007. Three mine action teams were trained in May 2006 and deployed in Eastern Equatoria in June 2006. Two teams were also deployed to sites in Central Equatoria along the border between South Sudan and Uganda in response to reports of abandoned caches of weapons and ammunition. MAG has established a road clearance capacity in support of and funded by the World Food Programme (WFP).^[67]

Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) clearance tasks in 2006 were focused on the Yei-Juba axis, largely agricultural land and support of the resettlement of IDPs. A new battle area clearance team was trained and operational as of June 2006.^[68]

Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) carried out survey and clearance from June 2006 focusing on local and migrating populations, and securing access to agricultural land and water sources in Kassala and Red Sea states, South Kordofan and Darfur. The project deployed 10 teams to conduct survey, marking, clearance and destruction of stockpiled ERW.^[69]

The local NGO Nuba Mountain Mine Action Sudan received equipment and training in 2006 to begin clearance operations in 2007, in addition to carrying out mine risk education and victim assistance. Although training on a demining machine funded by UNDP was completed by March 2007, manual clearance staff still required training and operational funding had not been received.^[70]

RONCO’s contracts for clearance and EOD in Rumbek, Malakal, Juba, Wau and Ed Damazin ended on 30 June 2006.^[71] In July 2006 ArmorGroup International won a UN clearance contract worth about $7 million, targeting the southern Sudanese areas of Juba, Wau and Malakal. According to UNMAS, ArmorGroup cleared 2,088,698 square meters of land in 2006; ArmorGroup had both clearance and survey operations in South Sudan in 2006.^[72]

Identification, Marking and Fencing of Affected Areas

A variety of assessments and surveys were conducted during the reporting period. A nationwide Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) was conducted in 2006-2007, managed by the Survey Action Center (SAC) and implemented by MAG. By 31 May, Eastern Equatoria, Blue Nile, Kassala, Red Sea, Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Gedaref States had been surveyed. MAG began the LIS in Warrap, Central Equatoria and Western Bahr el Ghazal in July 2007. Funding was secured to begin surveying Lakes state in November. As a result, at the end of 2007 the LIS was expected to have been completed or be ongoing in 12 states including Sennar, which was declared mine-free by the state authorities.^[73] The five-year national mine action plan for Sudan calls for the LIS to be completed by the end of 2008; it is intended to cover all 21 states suspected to be contaminated by mines and ERW.^[74]

The LIS in Eastern Equatoria identified 43 impacted communities and 83 suspected hazardous areas. In Blue Nile state the survey identified 33 impacted communities and 61 suspected hazardous areas; the 76 impacted communities represent 8.2 percent of all communities in the two states.^[75] Areas of highest contamination in Eastern Equatoria were the counties of Magwi and Torit, to which 20,300 and 7,300 IDPs, respectively, are waiting to return; 83,087 people were already living in communities impacted by mines and ERW. As of March 2007 MAG was developing a plan to clear these areas as a matter of priority. ^[76]

In Blue Nile State the most impacted locality was Karmuk, with two-thirds of the state’s impacted communities. An estimated 61,431 refugees and IDPs were planning to return to 31 of the 33 mine-impacted communities.^[77]

From April to June 2006 an FSD rapid response survey team conducted verification of all known dangerous areas in North Darfur state, in addition to the survey/clearance operation noted previously.^[78] NPA conducted general survey in the Yei-Juba-Maridi-Mundri area.^[79] In October 2006 UNMAO carried out a route survey in North Darfur following allegations that the GOS had emplaced landmines; two completed surveys found no evidence of any mine-laying.^[80]

Technical survey in 2006 covered 11,004 kilometers of road and identified and marked 32 minefields with an area of 1,261,897 square meters. The minefields were identified from 18 dangerous areas with a total area previously estimated to be 62,242,306 square meters. As of March 2007 technical survey was ongoing in three other dangerous areas (over 24 square kilometers). ^[81]

In southern Sudan the SSDA reported that little marking and fencing had occurred. According to UNMAO, communities in southern Sudan often knew the danger areas and were good at putting up their own markings to avoid them. ^[82]

Landmine and ERW Clearance

Manual mine clearance was the most common demining technique used in Sudan in 2006, responsible for the most area cleared in all regions with the exception of Upper Nile where mechanical demining was most common. Mine detection dogs were used for clearance only in Equatoria, although several demining operators integrate mine detection dogs into their operations.^[83] In December 2006 the first Sudanese dog handler was qualified and deployed on Mechem road clearance in South Kordofan.^[84]

It has not been possible to reconcile the varying statistics provided for the demining achievements of the Sudan program in 2006 by UNMAO and several operators. According to UNMAO, demining operations cleared 1.34 square kilometers of mined areas and a further 6.44 square kilometers of battle areas. Similarly, no comprehensive data was reported on the handover of cleared lands in 2006; it appears there is no standardized procedure for this. Several operators reported they had their own handover procedures. NPA reported that local communities had developed an expectation that land must be flailed in order for it to be ready for occupation; unless this happened, there was reluctance to enter cleared land. This problem had been raised with the South Sudan Demining Commission.^[85]

UNMAO reported that during the first quarter of 2007, 53 quality assurance visits were carried out to mine action projects in Sudan, of which two resulted in stopping operations and 10 resulted in failure.^[86] No demining accidents were reported by operators who responded to Landmine Monitor enquiries on their operations in 2006.

Summary of Efforts to Comply with Article 5

In accordance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Sudan is required to destroy all mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but no later than 1 April 2014.

Progress to date has been slow, although there are signs that the program is gaining momentum both in terms of institutional capacity and operational results. From 2002 to 2005 a total of 2.3 square kilometers had been cleared, with over half of that amount cleared in 2005. In 2006, according to UNMAO data, this clearance rate rose to 7.8 square kilometers.

According to UNMAS, demining capacity in the Sudan mine action program has increased significantly since 2002, explaining the increase in clearance statistics. Following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and UN Resolution 1590 (2005), UNMIS was established and tasked with “providing humanitarian demining assistance, technical advice and coordination.” Funding received from the assessed budget of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations has allowed for the increase in mine action achievements.^[87]

At the Seventh Meeting of States Parties in September 2006, Sudan outlined several challenges to mine action: limited national capacity and limited funding for national capacity development; the country’s size and poor infrastructure; difficulty in accessing remote areas; poor coordination and cooperation between stakeholders; ineffective resource allocation and use; and lack of information/maps on mine-affected areas.^[89]

Constraints noted by others included the rainy season, insecurity in some areas and inadequate funding of some demining projects. Delays in receipt of funding for mine action were reported to have limited progress towards Sudan’s objectives in 2006. For example, in June 2006 the UN reported just six percent of requirements met, and the World Food Programme (WPF) reported that demining teams would be demobilized and all work east of the Nile would cease as a result of a funding shortfall of $66.5 million.^[90] At the end of 2006 the UN Portfolio of Mine Action Projects reported that Sudan received only 53 percent of mine action funding requested for 2006, and noted the likely adverse impact on humanitarian, development and repatriation activities.^[91]

Mine Risk Education

In 2006 mine risk education (MRE) activities and capacity continued to expand in Sudan, especially emergency MRE for IDPs and refugees. In 2006, 476,976 people received MRE―almost as many as in all previous years combined (571,074).^[92] In the first six months of 2007 a further 438,565 people participated in MRE sessions throughout the country.^[93] MRE is a priority sector in UNMAO workplans and an integral part of its mine action strategy.^[94] In 2007-2008 it was planned to evolve from emergency MRE conducted by NGOs to a more sustainable long-term approach implemented by existing structures such as schools and community centers.

UNICEF is the lead agency coordinating MRE in Sudan, providing technical, financial and training support to implementing agencies, which included five international NGOs in 2006: DanChurchAid, MAG, Save the Children US and, new in 2006, Association for Aid and Relief Japan (AAR Japan) and Danish Demining Group (DDG). At least six national NGOs also provided MRE: Organization for Care of War Disabled and Protection from Landmines (ABRAR), Friends of Peace and Development Organization (FPDO), Sudanese Association for Combating Landmines (JASMAR), Operation Save Innocent Lives (OSIL), Sudan Landmine Response (SLR) and the Sudanese Red Crescent Society (SRCS).^[95] Other mine action agencies undertook ad hoc MRE and community liaison activities in the course of clearance, survey or repatriation activities.^[96] MRE was also provided to Sudanese refugees living in neighboring Kenya and Ethiopia.^[97]

In 2006 a peak of 39 MRE teams with 109 trainers was reached; in March 2007 there were 30 MRE teams with 91 trainers. Despite this apparent decrease in capacity, the impact of MRE activities was increased by relying more on teachers and community workers and less on NGO-based teams. In southern Darfur 55 people from local authorities and NGOs received MRE training to integrate MRE in their regular activities. ^[98]

MRE in 2006-2007 continued to focus on IDPs and refugees in the greater Khartoum area and en-route to eastern, central and southern Sudan, as well as young and adult males who are most likely to tamper with ERW. Priority setting continues to be hampered by a lack of adequate data.^[99] Although IDPs and refugees continue to be the most at-risk groups, MRE may have prevented any increase in casualties in these groups in 2006.^[100] A joint MRE campaign led by UNICEF under the UNMAO umbrella including UNMIS and MRE NGOs targeted IDPs in Khartoum state, Mayo, Dar al-Salam and al-Salam IDP camps and also covered other affected states in the country. UNICEF and AAR Japan produced 250,000 leaflets and 100,000 posters for the campaign which were distributed by MRE operators. Additionally, MRE messages were broadcast through the radio and a theater show was started. Expansion of this joint campaign to cover all the affected states in Sudan was planned.^[101]

Since May 2006 FPDO has operated two MRE teams in Kassala state working with IDPs and returnees. FPDO planned to expand operations to the Hamesh Koreib region and areas around Kassala city; by March 2007 FPDO had managed to target all IDP camps in Kassala City, with UNICEF funding.^[102] The Sudanese Red Crescent Society trained 20 school teachers in IDP camps in Kassala state.

UNICEF started intensive MRE campaigns in all three Darfur states in response to the increase in ERW incidents and casualties there. It cooperated with JASMAR in South Darfur and 55 local officials were trained by UNMAO to integrate MRE in their regular activities.^[103] MRE projects also started in the three southern areas of Juba, Malakal and Wau and in the north in South Kordofan.^[104]

Danish Demining Group, one of the implementing partners for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in support of repatriation, trained teams in October 2006 and started operating in November 2006 combining MRE and community liaison with survey teams. UNHCR identifies priority areas for DDG, which then meets community representatives, starts community mapping and completes the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) community data sheet. DDG works mainly with people identified as having most influence on the risk-taking behavior of new returnees, and also conducts MRE in areas where DDG clearance and survey activity are taking place. In January 2007 DDG started working in Kajo Keji district. JASMAR continued MRE activities in Khartoum, Kosti, Eldien, Damazin, Blue Nile State and South Kordofan in 2006.^[105]

Geographically, in 2006 only Wau was considered to be under-served in terms of MRE, lacking resources which UNICEF and MAG worked to provide.

UNMAO provides landmine safety briefings for staff members of aid organizations and the UN; in 2006, 6,693 staff were briefed. The UN Department of Safety and Security also conducts security workshops including mine/ERW safety.^[106]

In 2007 to develop a more sustainable long-term approach to MRE implemented by existing structures, UNMAO worked with the Ministry of Education to integrate MRE into the school curriculum in affected areas; three focal points for mine action were appointed in the ministry. MRE training for teachers was provided in 2007. According to the 2006-2007 workplan, a total of 1,000 teachers and volunteers were to be trained in MRE delivery in North and South Sudan and an additional 150 teachers in Darfur.^[107] UNICEF started to increase the involvement of governmental actors in the north and south of the country by training UNMAO staff and local NGOs.^[108] At the NMAC a new MRE officer was recruited to work with the UNMAO MRE department. UNMAO and the government mine action partners finalized the revised National Strategic Framework for Mine Action (June 2006), including MRE.^[109] NGO MRE teams will remain, concentrating on rapid response in emergency situations.

Landmine/ERW Casualties

In 2006 there were at least 135 new mine/ERW casualties in Sudan, including 57 killed and 78 injured.^[110] This represented a significant increase from 99 casualties (20 killed, 79 injured) reported in 2005 and from 73 casualties (21 killed, 52 injured) reported in 2004.^[111] Due to the size of the country and slow data collection, the 2006 casualty number is likely to increase as was the case in previous years.^[112] UNMAO reported 112 new mine/ERW casualties in 2006 (34 killed, 78 injured). An additional incident was not recorded by UNMAO in the IMSMA database as restricted access to the incident area impeded verification: in November 2006 in eastern Sudan 23 people were killed while traveling on a road; UNMAO could not ascertain whether a mine or ERW caused the incident.^[113]

All casualties were civilian except for one deminer and one child soldier; 27 casualties were due to antipersonnel mines, 19 to antivehicle mines, two to cluster submunitions, 18 to other ERW, six to grenades, one to a fuze and 39 were due to unknown devices. At least 27 children and one child soldier casualties were aged under 18 years (three girls and 25 boys). Most incidents in the IMSMA database occurred in North Darfur (34), Kassala state (21), Upper Nile (19) and Bahr al-Jabal (19). Incidents also occurred in al-Buhayrat and Western Bahr al-Ghazal (six each), Southern Kordofan (four), and one each in Blue Nile, Warab and Northern Bahr al-Ghazal.^[114] MRE operators reported that ERW incidents occurred in all three states in Darfur, but not all casualties were recorded in IMSMA.^[115]

Between 1 January and 31 March 2006, Landmine Action recorded 15 mine/ERW casualties in Blue Nile state; operations ceased on 31 March.^[116]

According to UNMAO data recorded in IMSMA, 13 casualties occurred while traveling, six while tending animals, 14 while playing, four while tampering, two while farming, one each while collecting, hunting/fishing, demining, while engaged in military activity and while passing or standing near the device, and 68 were unknown.^[117]

The US Department of State estimated that approximately 51 civilians were killed in mine incidents in southern Sudan between January and September 2006, “although some observers believed the number to be much higher since only a small percentage of deaths were actually reported to the UN.”^[118] The pilot LIS carried out by MAG identified 10 “recent” casualties in Blue Nile state and 28 in Eastern Equatoria (seven were killed and 31 injured); there appeared to be more ERW than mine casualties.^[119]

Casualties continued to be reported in 2007. UNMAO recorded 20 new mine/ERW casualties as of June 2007 (11 killed and nine injured). Almost all were boys (17), one was an adult male, and two were girls.^[120] Nine casualties were caused by ERW, one by an antipersonnel mine and 10 were unknown. The casualties occurred in North Darfur (six), Western Darfur and Southern Kordofan (four each), Bahr al-Jabal and Gedaref (two each), and Kassala and Upper Nile (one each).^[121] In view of the time needed to report, collect and transfer data to the IMSMA database in Khartoum there may well have been more than 20 casualties in this period. Another two casualties in Kassala state were not included due to pending verification. There was also an unconfirmed ERW incident reported by JASMAR in Eddain, Southern Darfur, and an SPLA deminer was injured by an antipersonnel mine in Malakal minefield.^[122]

Despite limitations of data collection in Sudan, it was evident that in 2006-2007 the majority of casualties were civilian males, as in previous years. ERW posed a bigger threat than mines in the three Darfur states, but mines were the biggest danger in the eastern states. There were significant changes in the locations where casualties occurred compared to 2005: Southern Kordofan no longer accounted for the majority of casualties (62 percent of total casualties in 2005). Recorded casualties in Kassala increased due to improved data collection. But under-reporting remains significant and it is still believed that there are near-daily mine incidents in the eastern states of Kassala, Gedaref and Sinnar. The most disquieting trend is the increased rate of ERW casualties in Northern Darfur, due to exacerbated conflict and limited MRE, but also due to improved data from emergency survey activity. Intensive MRE campaigns started in the three Darfur states in response to the increased number of ERW incidents.^[123]

For several years it was expected that the number of mine/ERW casualties would increase as a result of IDP and refugee return. Despite insufficient data, this does not appear to be the case as of mid-2007, likely due to MRE efforts.^[124]

The total number of mine/UXO casualties in Sudan remains unknown. Some authorities in Sudan estimate there have been 10,000 mine/ERW casualties. According to the Sudan Red Crescent Society (SRCS), there are approximately 1,000 mine survivors in Kassala.^[125] As of May 2007, a total of 2,414 mine/UXO casualties had been recorded by UNMAO (726 killed and 1,688 injured). The majority of reported casualties occurred in six states: Southern Kordofan (581 casualties), Kassala (419), Blue Nile (318), Bahr al-Jabal (297), Western Bahr al-Ghazal (279), and Upper Nile (167).^[126] Again, Northern Darfur reported a significant increase in casualties from eight recorded casualties by April 2006 to 49 by March 2007. Most casualties were male (nearly 90 percent) and about 14 percent were children. Most common activities at the time of the incident included traveling (724), military activity (553), collecting water, food or wood (198), playing (123), farming (122), tending animals (118); 19 percent of casualties occurred while carrying out livelihood activities. There was no marked increase in casualties caused by tampering during IDP and refugee resettlement in South Sudan, as was anticipated in 2006.^[127]

SLR data that was sufficiently detailed was incorporated into the IMSMA database. However, integration appears to be minimal as SLR identified 1,215 casualties as of March 2006, including 424 killed and 791 injured.^[128] SLIRI information provided in 2005 could not be entered into the database due to lack of detail.^[129]

In 2006 a survey of war injured in Atbara, the capital of Nile state, recorded 541 war-injured, even though the state has never seen conflict. Most of the people identified were injured during the conflict in the south and returned home afterwards.^[130]

Data Collection

There is no mechanism of systematic and nationwide data collection for mine/ERW casualties in Sudan. Where casualty data is collected it does not contain the necessary level of detail to analyze shifts in casualty profiles, as there is insufficient distinction in personal details, activities and device types. Data collection “rarely delineates between mine/ERW casualties and injuries sustained through other causes (i.e. gunshots, medical conditions, road traffic accidents, etc.).”^[131] Some data collectors do not include civilian or fatal casualties. In many cases, data does not include information on the location of the incident, which would prevent duplication in recording of incidents.^[132]

Casualty data is collected by UNMAO, the Ministry of Social Welfare and Women and Children’s Care, UN agencies, disabled people’s organizations, ICRC and various NGOs, but it is “still limited and additional efforts are required to gather more information and to harmonise the existing records with the IMSMA data base.”^[133] One of the main objectives of the National Strategic Framework is to synchronize all available databases by December 2008. ^[134] This objective has been postponed since 2005.^[135]

UNMAO maintains a central IMSMA database in Khartoum; two regional modules are maintained in the UNMAO regional offices in Juba (south) and Kadugli (Nuba Mountains). Additional read-only copies are installed in seven more UNMAO sub-offices and several mine action organizations. Updates are received weekly from the regional offices but synchronization of information from the other offices takes longer. The Khartoum office provides detailed casualty data analysis upon request.^[136]

In the south, there is no “formalised system of regular inspection of hospital record or information exchange with health based NGOs or refugee/IDP agencies.”^[137] In eastern Sudan, the collection of casualty data has improved due to reduced restrictions on the movement of UNMAO staff and improved cooperation between UN, local authorities, local organizations and hospitals.^[138] However, many casualties remain unrecorded.

Casualty data does not appear to be used for planning purposes: “due to the limited information regarding the number and needs of mine/ERW victims, there are no accurate estimates available to meet existing needs in mine affected areas…. Data collection systems need to be strengthened and implemented consistently throughout the most affected areas in the country.” At present, there is insufficient information on the needs and living conditions of mine/ERW survivors, their families and communities.^[139]

The UNMAO victim assistance associate reached an agreement with the Ministry of Health to incorporate IMSMA casualty report forms into standard questionnaires in hospitals and to enable the creation of a database of mine/ERW casualties and other people with disabilities. There were training initiatives on data collection in 2006-2007: UNICEF/UNMAO trained 92 health personnel on completing the IMSMA forms in South Kordofan, and a data collection workshop was conducted for 28 Ministry of Health staff from Southern Kordofan in Kadugli (Nuba Mountains).^[140] An assessment was started in April 2007 in five of the most affected states to identify casualties, attitudes towards landmines and services needed.^[141] Within the framework of the LIS, additional casualty information will be collected in Blue Nile, Eastern Equatoria, Kassala, Gedaref, Sinnar, Northern Bahr al-Ghazal and Red Sea states.

The government does not possess accurate statistics on the number of people with disabilities in Sudan. Ministry of Social Welfare and Women and Children’s Care organized a meeting with relevant authorities to include disability in the national census starting on 15 April 2007. However, cause of disability was reportedly not included in the questionnaire.^[142]

Survivor Assistance

Years of conflict have seriously damaged health and social services in Sudan. Although there are several organizations working on disability issues, both governmental and nongovernmental actors lack capacity, there is a general lack of awareness, and services are insufficient to address the needs of mine/ERW survivors and other people with disabilities.

Medical services vary significantly from region to region, with the least services in southern Sudan. Emergency care is provided free of charge, but lack of transportation results in many mine/ERW casualties dying on the way to first-aid.^[143] However, the health system’s ability to deliver services to which disabled people have a theoretical right is severely limited. The number of people working in healthcare is unknown; facilities suffer from years of neglect and under-resourcing; and medical equipment, trained staff, and health and information management systems are inadequate. Few hospitals can carry out complex surgery. In some cases, military hospitals provide services to civilians, but these services are not free of charge.

There were an estimated 40,000 people in Sudan needing artificial limbs or orthoses, 25 percent of them weapon-injured.^[144] Rehabilitation services, especially production and distribution of prosthetic devices, have received most attention in Sudan, with centers in all parts of the country. Artificial limbs have been free for mine/ERW survivors since 2003, but access to centers can be restricted due to long distances, poor roads, security concerns and poverty; people must wait several months to receive rehabilitative care.^[145]

Psychosocial support and socioeconomic reintegration are lacking throughout the country.^[146] Most services are located in northern Sudan. Additional challenges are Sudan’s general economic situation, as well as a lack of awareness among employers, information about existing services among mine/ERW survivors, capacity among service providers and donor interest. Job placement and recruitment services do not ensure access to employment for people with disabilities. Approximately 42 percent of mine/ERW survivors lost their livelihoods after the incident, as they usually live off subsistence farming or animal husbandry.^[147] Psychosocial projects mainly target war victims in general.^[148]

Sudan has legislation to protect the rights of people with disabilities, but this has not been consistently implemented or monitored, particularly in the south, and there is a lack of public awareness and interest in the issue.^[149] Education and transportation is free for people with disabilities. In 2005 it was announced that organizations with five percent disabled staff would get special tax exemptions.^[150] In 2006 a constitutional change modified the law stating that two percent of the governmental labor force should be disabled.^[151]

Sudan has stated that further disability legislation will be based on the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which Sudan signed on 30 March 2007; Sudan did not sign the Optional Protocol which allows the monitoring of services.^[152] On 4 April 2007 the Ministry of Social Welfare and Women and Children’s Care held a seminar to raise the awareness of the convention for ministries, press and NGOs and to explain how the convention’s provisions can be entered into Sudan’s disability plan.^[153] UNMAO is a member of the High Council for Disability.^[154]

Progress in Meeting VA24 Survivor Assistance Objectives

Sudan is one of 24 States Parties identified at the First Review Conference in November-December 2004 as having significant numbers of mine survivors and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation and reintegration of survivors.^[155] Subsequently, at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in November 2005, Sudan presented its 2005-2009 victim assistance objectives under the Nairobi Action Plan.^[156]

In September 2006, at the Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Sudan provided an update on its plans for achieving its victim assistance objectives under the Nairobi Action Plan. In April 2007, at the Standing Committee meetings, Sudan did not provide an update on progress towards achieving these objectives.^[157] Although Sudan’s victim assistance plans were not provided for inclusion in the Standing Committee co-chairs’ report, the objectives were included in revised form in Sudan’s draft National Strategic Framework of March 2007. Additional objectives included increased survivor inclusion, resource mobilization and advocacy (with the earliest deadline at the end of 2007). Most objectives need to be fulfilled by the end of 2011; the earliest deadline for objectives relating to actual assistance is the end of 2008.^[158] Many of the objectives are elaborated from earlier workplans and strategies, which specified establishment of a nationwide data collection mechanism by December 2005, a needs assessment by December 2006, sustainable rehabilitation capacity by December 2008 with the implementation of the VA strategy by NMAO no more than six months after signing the comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) (signed on 9 January 2005).^[159]

Since the Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Sudan has been one of the co-chairs for the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration together with Austria. This has resulted in more attention for survivor assistance issues at government level in Sudan.^[160]

Sudan’s interim report detailing progress made towards the achievement of the Millenium Development goals states that access to education for children with disabilities and disability awareness in courses for teachers are priority intervention areas. It does not mention any other disability issues and does not link to mine action.^[161]

Survivor Assistance Strategic Framework

Under the NMAA, the National Mine Action Committee and the Regional Mine Action Center in South Sudan implement and coordinate survivor assistance activities with technical assistance from UNMAO. The National Authority for Prosthetics and Orthotics coordinates survivor assistance within the NMAA Victim Assistance Working Group, which includes the Ministry of Social Affairs and Women and Children’s Care, Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Education.^[162] In March 2007 a first draft of the National Victim Assistance Strategic Framework 2007-2011 was developed; a workplan was scheduled for completion in June 2007, six months later than planned.^[163]

UNMAO does not implement victim assistance, but holds coordination meetings, helps in resource mobilization and supervises the Human Security Trust Fund (HSTF) project.^[164] The HSTF will provide funds for social integration, advocacy, production of mobility devices and economic empowerment, focusing on mine-affected areas all over central and southern Sudan, including Juba, Damazin, Wau, Kadugli and Malakal.^[165] However, the pilot projects in the selection so far are implemented by northern NGOs in Khartoum, Kassala, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states.^[166] The project was scheduled to start in June 2006 for a period of 18 months, but was delayed until 2007, starting with a needs assessment in Juba and Wau in preparation for survivor assistance projects. Initially, the priority is to build the capacity of relevant stakeholders.^[167] UNMAS is responsible for coordinating the HSTF project, UNDP for implementing the socioeconomic reintegration and vocational training component, and UNICEF for MRE.

Although UNMAO has a victim assistance associate in Khartoum and two victim assistance/MRE officers in Juba and Kadugli, coordination between stakeholders needed strengthening and there was a lack of strategic planning and capacity-building to implement victim assistance programs. At the start of 2007 an international consultant was recruited to assist in developing the strategic framework, workplan and needs assessments, to ensure implementation of survivor assistance activities and to secure more funding.^[168]

In March 2007, UNMAO, NMAC and the South Sudan Regional Mine Action Center organized a national survivor assistance workshop in Juba to review the first draft of the National Strategic Framework, to create common ground for a better understanding of survivor assistance and disability and to exchange experiences on ongoing and planned activities. The workshop was regarded as the starting point for a network of assistance providers and activities.^[169] The main weaknesses identified in the strategic framework were: lack of financial resources, rigid hierarchy and fragmentation of political institutions, little interest and awareness of survivor assistance, lack of cooperation between political, social and medical institutions as well as between UN agencies, NGOs and local organizations, and lack of information on services.^[170] A previous “national coordination meeting” in May 2006 identified the need for improved coordination and a strengthened victim assistance network, and improved surveillance and data collection capacity.^[171]

In the north, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Women and Children’s Care is the focal point for disability issues.^[172]

At least 7,171 people with disabilities in Sudan received services during 2006, including 319 mine/ERW survivors. Within this total, ICRC provided physical rehabilitation to 3,704 people (122 mine/ERW survivors), trained 13 technicians in Khartoum and sponsored training for 13 prosthetic/orthotic technicians abroad.^[173] The US NGO Medical Care Development International (MCDI) provided physical rehabilitation to 1,157 people (37 mine/ERW survivors) most of these beneficiaries also receive literacy classes and are including in the socioeconomic gardening program.^[174] The Sudan Evangelical Mission provided mobility devices to 49 survivors and socioeconomic reintegration to 40 others. The Child Trauma Center provided psychosocial support to 650 children (number of mine/ERW survivors unknown). ABRAR referred nine survivors for physical rehabilitation, provided economic integration to 28 survivors, and gave health training to 43; 1,000 people received one-off economic assistance.^[175] Peace and Tolerance International Organization organized rights awareness workshops for 500 people with disabilities in four cities.^[176] Complete figures from the Juba Orthopedic Center were not available; NAPO provided global activity figures, covering more than the year 2006: it treated 13,172 people with disabilities (944 survivors) to 28 June 2007.^[177]

After closure of the ICRC hospital in Lokichokio, Kenya on 30 June 2006, the 500-bed Juba Teaching Hospital became the main medical center for mine/ERW casualties, with support from ICRC to sustain equivalent services. In 2006 ICRC also supported the hospital in Malakal and primary healthcare facilities, and operated a mobile clinic in Darfur where it treated 442 weapon-injured people. War surgery workshops were held for medical personnel in Darfur and first-aid sessions were organized in remote or volatile areas.^[178]

The Juba Orthopedic Workshop Center (formerly Nile Assistance for Disabled) run by the Ministry of Social Welfare and Women and Children’s Care, did not experience the large increase in patients expected following closure of the Lopiding rehabilitation center in June 2006. The Juba center produces lower limbs and other mobility devices, but their quality needs improvement. The center received referrals from Médecins sans Frontières, ICRC and other NGOs; it was able to provide about 30 devices per month and had limited staff.^[179] ICRC signed a six-year agreement to build a new prosthetic/orthotic referral center in Juba starting in January 2007 and scheduled it to be operational by 2008 to meet rehabilitation demands in the region.^[180] Also in South Sudan, rehabilitation services were available in Rumbek.

The ICRC-supported centers assisted more people than in 2005 and also significantly more mine/ERW survivors; only 790 of the beneficiaries were new patients. Priority was given to women and children needing rehabilitation.^[181] ICRC continued its prosthetics/orthotics diploma course and sponsored prosthetic and orthotic training abroad. Some of the graduates will be assigned to the satellite clinics to reinforce capacity.^[182]

Medair continued to provide emergency evacuation, to operate health centers/units and a mobile health clinic, and to provide emergency medical assistance via mobile response teams in southern Sudan.^[183] Many other NGOs provide primary and other healthcare services in conflict areas of Sudan. There are no programs specifically for mine/ERW survivors, but some mine action organizations provide ad hoc emergency transport and medical referral for mine/ERW casualties.^[184]

The National Authority for Prosthetics and Orthotics, affiliated with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Women and Children’s Care, is the main provider of physical rehabilitation services in Khartoum and at five satellite centers. NAPO’s services were free of charge, but the cost of transportation and accommodation was not covered. NAPO has increased responsibility for raw material acquisition, which is funded by the government and are bought in Switzerland. The Khartoum center supported by ICRC continued to operate at capacity; five percent of its staff were people with disabilities. The capacity and number of beneficiaries in Nyala (South Darfur), including 179 mine/ERW survivors, increased in 2006 due to continued ICRC support. However, the satellite centers were frequently inactive and needed technical support, especially the Kadugli center.^[185] NAPO also provides psychological support to people with disabilities.

Handicap International (HI) was scheduled to support the NAPO satellite centers in Damazin, Kadugli and Kassala by the end of 2006 and to start a three-year physiotherapy diploma course, but had not obtained funding. In 2007 HI carried out an exploratory mission in southern Sudan to address short-term survivor assistance needs.^[186] HI also planned to construct physical rehabilitation centers in Bor and Yonglei.^[187] The project in Yonglei started at the end of June 2007 and includes training of health staff, equipping health facilities, setting up a follow-up and referral system for injury management, disability prevention and rehabilitation, training on IMSMA, setting up a disability database, and counseling and livelihood training for government social workers.^[188]

Medical Care Development International (MCDI) provides physical and socioeconomic rehabilitation for disabled war victims from al-Buhayat and neighboring states through the Rumbek Rehabilitation Center; the project will last until August 2009. The center established a database of people with disabilities for socioeconomic reintegration purposes, and provided an outreach team, literacy classes and a horticulture project. The main challenges are the need for a long-term strategy for mobility aids, component supplies, a lack of transportation for patients and the provision of tricycles.^[189]

The military’s al-Amal hospital, rehabilitation and vocational training center, located 40 kilometers outside of Khartoum and open since 2005, ceased operations at the end of 2006 due to a lack of funding and the inaccessible location.^[190]

USRATUNA/OVCI (Our Family) is an Italian-run rehabilitation center in Juba and Khartoum targeting children. In 2007 it started a bachelor degree in rehabilitation studies in cooperation with the University of Ahfad (Khartoum). It planned to build a physical rehabilitation practice center next to the university for the students.^[191]

The Sudan Evangelical Mission (SEM), in its mine-related work, focuses on physical rehabilitation, psychological support and economic reintegration in Western Equatoria. In 2007 SEM also started a survivor needs assessment in Wau and Raja, with technical assistance from UNMAO; approximately 534 survivors had been identified as of June 2007.^[192]

The Ministry of Social Welfare and Women and Children’s Care in the south operates the Child Trauma Care Center in Juba with UNICEF support, to provide psychosocial support and conflict resolution skills for child war victims, including landmine survivors. In 2006, the center provided psychosocial support to 650 children and trained children, teachers, social workers and parents on how to deal with traumatic situations.^[193]

The Organization for Care of War Disabled and Protection from Landmines (ABRAR) assists war victims, including landmine survivors, through medical care, physiotherapy, psychosocial support, vocational training, sports and art programs, legal aid, advocacy, and awareness-raising. It received funding for two human rights projects for people with disabilities.^[194]

The International Sisterhood Charity Organization (ISCO) in southern Sudan aims to assist people with disabilities through data collection, medical, socioeconomic and awareness-raising projects in Red Sea and Abyei states and IDP camps in Khartoum, in coordination with UNMAO. In 2006 it trained staff in IMSMA casualty data collection, provided income-generating activities to mine/ERW survivors and rights education to people with disabilities. In 2007, it also started a survivor needs assessment in Juba. However, the organization faces financial, information and capacity challenges.^[195]

Peace and Tolerance International Organization (PTIO) provides training on limb loss and war trauma for survivors in remote areas in Juba, other parts of the south, and Gedaref in the east. In 2006 it also undertook television campaigns and other awareness-raising projects on disability rights and prevention. It organized training of trainers courses for psychosocial support in Juba; approximately 30 people were trained. PTIO seeks to improve training on psychosocial issues as well as increased psychosocial services.^[196]

For other organizations involved in survivor assistance in Sudan, see Landmine Monitor Report 2006.^[197]

Cross-sectoral development programs such as the Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration process, UNHCR activities and the EC-funded €54.3 million ($68.2 million) Recovery and Rehabilitation Program (2006-2009) include healthcare facilities, and socioeconomic integration of demobilized military and vulnerable groups in mine/ERW-affected areas, but do not systematically link to mine/ERW survivor assistance or disability issues.^[198]

Funding and Assistance

Landmine Monitor identified international donations totaling $28,934,082 (€23,031,188) in 2006, contributed by 12 countries and the European Commission (EC). This represents a 38 percent decrease from 2005 ($46,914,250 provided by 14 countries and the EC), largely accounted for by the drop in Japan’s contribution in 2006.^[199] Donations for mine action in Sudan were provided by:

• Austria: €360,000 ($452,268) to DDG for emergency survey, EOD and MRE in South Sudan;^[200]
• Canada: C$6,627,936 ($5,844,514) consisting of C$141,936 for mine clearance, C$851,000 to UNHCR for mine clearance, and C$649,000 to UNMAS for the LIS, C$1 million for mine action, C$1,986,000 for emergency mine action, and C$2 million for demining in Blue Nile state;^[201]
• Denmark: DKK9 million ($1,514,700) to DanChurchAid for integrated mine action;^[202]
• EC: €1,381,263 ($1,735,281) consisting of €400,000 to DDG for survey, EOD and MRE in South Sudan, €568,442 to MAG for Mine Action Team Rapid Response in Eastern Equatoria, and €412,821 to UNMAS for unspecified mine action;^[203]
• Germany: €403,876 ($507,389) to NPA for demining in South Sudan;^[204]
• Italy: €344,000 ($432,167) to UNMAS for demining in South Sudan;^[205]
• Japan: ¥624,016,140 ($5,366,539) consisting of ¥51,418,422 to FSD for survey, ¥45,854,322 to UNMAS for MRE, ¥193,743,396 via the UN Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS) to UNMAS to for victim assistance and MRE, and ¥333,000,000 to UNMAS for survey and mine clearance in southwestern Sudan, victim assistance and MRE;^[206]
• Netherlands: €3,649,604 ($4,584,998) consisting of €230,000 to NPA for mine clearance, €919,604 to HALO for mine clearance, and €2,500,000 to UNMAS for mine clearance;^[207]
• Norway: NOK20 million ($3,120,000) to NPA for unspecified mine action in South Sudan;^[208]
• Slovenia: SIT4,250,001 ($22,100) for mine action;^[209]
• Switzerland: CHF1,750,000 ($1,396,500) consisting of CHF1 million to WFP for mine action, and to FSD CHF100,000 FSD for demining equipment and CHF650,000 for mine action;^[210]
• UK: £519,489 ($957,626) to MAG for mine/UXO clearance;^[211]
• US: $3 million, consisting of $2,400,000 to UNDP, Cranfield University, MAG, NPA and DanChurchAid for capacity-building, mine clearance, EOD, survey and MRE, and $600,000 to MAG for small arms/light weapons destruction.^[212]

The 2006 end-year review of the UN’s Portfolio of Mine Action Projects reported that Sudan received 53 percent ($48,628,738) of funding requested through the appeal process in 2006. The review added that funding gaps in 2006 may result in “the slow implementation of other humanitarian and/or development activities such as delivery of emergency aid or rehabilitation of important roads, and may prevent refugees and internally displaced persons from returning to their communities.” ^[213]

UNMAS reported allocating $38,457,878 to mine action in Sudan in 2006, including $9,799,178 in voluntary contributions (a sharp drop from over $15 million in 2005) from Canada, EC, Netherlands, Spain, UK and the UN Common Humanitarian Fund. UNMAS allocated funds to mine action projects conducted by SAC, MAG, DDG and AAR Japan.^[214] UNICEF allocated non-designated funds totaling $80,000 for MRE, emergency response and capacity-building in North Sudan in 2006.^[215]

UNDP reported receiving $967,000 in funding for mine action in Sudan in 2006: $482,000 from the Netherlands, $200,000 from Sweden, and $285,000 from Italy.^[216]

The 2007 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects includes 34 projects for Sudan with budgets totaling $89,077,603, of which $38,781,992 had been funded by November 2006.^[217]

National Contribution to Mine Action

The National Mine Action Center and South Sudan Demining Authority reported a total of $5,467,000 in national funding to mine action in 2006-2007. In a detailed costing, both NMAC and SSDA reported that mine action center salaries and running costs, and salaries of deminers, MRE and field staff, were covered entirely by national funding, and all imported equipment for mine action was tax-exempt. NMAC reported that logistics for demining operations and stockpile destruction costs were covered by national funds, and explosives for demining operations were provided. The SSDA donated 2,400 square meters of land for the South Sudan mine action center premises.^[218]