Key
developments since May 2001: Russian and Chechen forces continued to use
antipersonnel mines. UNICEF and the ICRC continued mine risk education and
survivor assistance programs in the North Caucuses. In 2001, there were at
least 154 civilian casualties caused by landmines, improvised explosive devices
and unexploded ordnance.
BACKGROUND
In September 1991, Chechnya declared independence
from Russia, and adopted the name Chechen Republic “Ichkeria.” On
11 December 1994, the Russian Federation (RF) sent troops into Chechnya where
mines were used extensively in the fighting by both sides. Although peace
agreements were signed in August 1996, relations remained tense and deteriorated
to the point of Russia sending troops back into Chechnya in September 1999.
Chechen forces evacuated Grozny in February 2000 and the conflict entered a
guerrilla war phase. Fighting, replete with massive violations of human rights
and laws of war, including widespread use of mines by both sides,
continues.[1]
See Landmine Monitor Report 2001 for details regarding production,
trade, and stockpiling of antipersonnel mines in Chechnya; no new information is
available.[2]
USE OF MINES BY RUSSIAN FORCES
Russian officials admit to large-scale use of
mines in Chechnya, describing the conflict as a “mine war,” but have
repeatedly rejected allegations of the indiscriminate use of mines by the
Russian forces.[3] In early
2001, a Russian military official reportedly said at a press conference that
Russian forces had sown more than 500,000 landmines in
Chechnya.[4] In July 2002, a
Chechen official claimed that Russia had sharply increased its use of mines in
2002, planting as many as one million in the past five to six months; he claimed
Russia has planted a total of approximately three million mines during the
second Chechen war.[5]
Again in early 2002, Russian officials stated that the requirements of
Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) are taken
into account when mines are used in Chechnya (even though the Russian Federation
is not party to CCW Amended Protocol II). They claim that all minefields are
fenced and marked to prevent civilian casualties, and that once active military
operations are over, minefields are
cleared.[6]
Neither past nor current reports coming out of Chechnya substantiate these
claims. For example, in January 2002, the Commandant of the Leninskaya
neighborhood of Grozny, Colonel V. Dushukhin, told Landmine Monitor he did not
have any information on the mined areas or maps of minefields. He said mine
clearance is only carried out when requested, for example, to clear a shell or a
mine from a house or yard.[7]
In Landmine Monitor field research in January 2002, villagers in a district near
the border with Georgia said they could not tell where the minefields begin or
end.
In August 2001, Russia described its mine use in Chechnya and Tajikistan to
Landmine Monitor: “Mine barriers have been laid to blockade specific base
areas used by [rebel] units and to close movement routes and convoy paths across
the state border, using fragmentation-action antipersonnel mines with
self-destruction mechanisms and control options that comply with requirements in
[Amended Protocol II].... Mines are emplaced primarily on sectors of the border
where difficult physical and geographical conditions do not permit other forces
or methods to be employed effectively, where there are virtually no local
inhabitants, and to protect and guard positions and places where border
divisions are
stationed.”[8]
According to Chechen officials, in 2001 and 2002, the Russian Army continued
to mine areas and paths leading to their troop positions, paths to checkpoints,
around commanders’ offices and governmental agencies. Many places that
the Army lists as “suspicious” are also mined. The purpose of this
mining is to restrict access through specific checkpoints to control the
population. There are 700 checkpoints and about 20 large and middle-sized Army
garrisons in Chechnya. Temporary military camps periodically appear and
disappear in different parts of Chechnya and land around these camps is usually
mined.[9]
There is also concern that with many different Army and Police detachments,
as well as contracted militaries from different parts of Russia and Commonwealth
of Independent States countries (including Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine),
engaging in the fighting in Chechnya and rotating out on a frequent basis (every
three to six months), forces may lay mines without providing their replacements
with proper mapping and other information.
USE OF MINES BY CHECHEN REBELS
During a June 2002 trip to Chechnya, Olara Otunnu,
the United Nations Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, said
“insurgent groups continued to enlist children, paying them to plant
landmines and other explosives, and to target civilians perceived to be
cooperating with the government
administration.”[10]
In interviews with Landmine Monitor (Russia), Russian engineers who have
served in Chechnya have stated that mine use by Chechen rebels increased during
2001 and 2002. They view this as predictable because the Chechens view mine
warfare as effective and because of the ready availability of components for the
production of improvised explosive
devices.[11] These engineers
believe Chechen combatants are increasingly relying on IEDs, perhaps in part
because of the lack of mass-produced landmines, but also because of the
abundance of artillery shells, grenades, explosives, and other components
necessary for makeshift production of homemade
mines.[12]
Ongoing use of mines by Chechens is such that Russian Army deminers monitor
and carry out mine clearance in Grozny and the main roads in Chechnya every day.
Roads used by Russian Army military columns are the only ones that are demined
by Army Engineer troops. Col-Gen. Nikolay Serdtsev, Chief of Russia’s
engineering forces, said in April 2001, “Every day our sappers discover
and disarm 10-15 landmines set by rebels for activation by wire and radio and
camouflaged as cellular telephones, radio receivers, tape recorders, and other
objects.”[13] From 3-9
September 2001, the Russian Army reported that it had neutralized approximately
270 explosives, including 32
landmines.[14]
Several times Landmine Monitor researchers were involuntary witnesses to
explosions of armored vehicles by IEDs in Grozny (on Zhukovskaya Street,
Pervomaiskaya Street and Staropromislovsky highway). In these cases, Russian
Army officers opened fire and detained all people in the nearby area. There
were numerous reports in 2001 of Russian Army retaliation resulting in civilian
casualties following military casualties from rebel-laid
IEDs.[15] According to one
media source, in 2001, there were an estimated 500 incidents, mostly from IEDs,
involving armored vehicles resulting in 87 Russian Army
deaths[16]
MINE PROBLEM
With the renewed fighting, it is impossible to get
accurate information about mined areas, but given that very limited mine
clearance took place after the 1994-96 war and given the continued mine-laying
by both sides, the mine problem can only be getting worse each
day.[17]
During his June 2002 trip to Russia, Otunnu called Chechnya “one of
the most landmine-polluted zones in the world.” After touring Chechnya
and neighboring regions, he said, “We estimate that 500,000 landmines have
been planted in Chechnya, which makes it one of the most landmine-polluted zones
in the world, especially given its
size.”[18]
Previous editions of Landmine Monitor have provided details on areas known
and suspected to be mined, and on the lack of marking of known mined areas.
Landmine Monitor conducted field research in Vedensky in January 2002,
interviewing over 100 local inhabitants. The Vedensky district and the
Argunskiy canyon on the border with Georgia are particularly dangerous
mine-affected areas. The local population believes the land surrounding all 26
villages in Vedensky to be mined, and they report a high number of mine
casualties.
Russian Army units are stationed near the villages and their bases are
protected by minefields. Villagers said that Russian helicopters spread mines
from the air, and that it is impossible to know where the minefields begin and
end. Village elders have repeatedly appealed to the command of the Russian Army
for information about exact locations of mined areas, but to no avail.
Inhabitants of Mahketi village said that all of their fields and pastures are
mined. People have not been able to go to their hayfields for the past three
years, and instead have been forced to buy hay at the market. One inhabitant
interviewed by Landmine Monitor said, “We cannot go to the forest for
firewood and are forced to purchase it in neighboring villages, where people
still gather firewood risking their lives.” Up to 40 percent of the
population is not able to obtain firewood and during the winter moves to areas
supplied by gas. The local population is often injured by mines as they graze
cattle or enter forested areas, and mines have claimed at least 200 cattle. The
villagers say the only ones being blown up by the mines are civilians and their
animals, not rebel fighters.
Flash floods in May-June 2002 reportedly dislocated numerous mines laid by
both sides, resulting in new mined areas with no exact location
identified.[19]
MINE CLEARANCE
There are no humanitarian mine clearance
operations underway in Chechnya. The HALO Trust carried out humanitarian mine
clearance in Chechnya between 1997 and December 1999 when Russian military
operations forced clearance to be suspended.
Russian engineering troops conduct military mine clearance operations on a
daily basis, to support the safe movement of Russian troops along the roads and
railroads, and the safe operation of field water supply
points.[20] Col-Gen. Nikolay
Serdtsev, Chief of Russia’s engineering forces, has said, “Every day
50-60 engineering-reconnaissance patrols are detached from our troops along
defined routes to check for the presence of mines and explosive devices and to
ensure the uninterrupted movement of military columns and civilian
equipment.”[21] From
January to mid-June 2002, Russian engineers reportedly defused 417 landmines and
944 explosive devices in
Chechnya.[22]
MINE RISK EDUCATION
International agencies such as the United Nations
International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and the International
Committee of the Red Cross are responsible for the bulk of mine risk education
(MRE) activities in affected areas in Russia. UNICEF launched a comprehensive
MRE and survivor assistance program in the north Caucuses during the reporting
period, working in conjunction with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), the ICRC, the Danish Demining Group (DDG), and a group of local NGOs,
including Voice of the Mountains (Chechnya/Ingushetia). UNICEF acts as the
coordinator for all mine-related activities carried out by the UN and other NGOs
in the region.
The centerpiece of the mine risk education program is the training of
approximately 194,000 children in Chechnya and
Ingushetia.[23] So far, 460
teachers from 458 functioning schools in Chechnya have taken UNICEF’s
“training-the-trainer” course and will teach mine risk education to
children ranging in age from 6 to 17. All school children in Chechnya will
receive the mine risk education course, which also includes distribution of
booklets, posters, leaflets, notebooks, t-shirts, pens, pencils, drawing sets,
and sweatshirts with mine awareness
messages.[24] The curriculum was
developed by UNICEF in collaboration with the Chechen Ministry of Education,
ICRC, UN, and NGO partners.[25]
In 2001, UNICEF spent approximately $1 million on the mine risk education and
survivor assistance program. In 2002, the program will concentrate on reaching
teachers and students in remote districts of Chechnya.
ICRC mine risk education efforts were focused on Ingushetia, Dagestan, and
the region including North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and other areas.
Internally displaced people (IDPs) from Chechnya were the main target group in
Ingushetia.[26] Billboards
placed in IDP centers are aimed mainly at the adult population, who were also
targeted through presentations and the distribution of posters. Some 600 adults
in Ingushetia are believed to have attended these seminars during the reporting
period.[27] Children in
Ingushetia are targeted by the ICRC’s “child-to-child” program
and over 500 children are believed to have been reached through this
program.[28]
In North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and southern Russia, children were also
the main target of the ICRC’s mine risk education effort. Chechen
children come to the North Caucuses throughout the year to stay in sanatoria
“as a break from the dire living conditions in
Chechnya.”[29] During the
reporting period, the ICRC provided approximately 2,000 of these children with
lessons in the “child-to-child” program. A few hundred teenagers
participated in a “teenager-to-teenager” program. Approximately
9,000 of the Chechen children have also seen an MRE puppet show. The ICRC also
distributed various mine awareness leaflets, comic books, and game sheets to
children and teachers.[30]
LANDMINE CASUALTIES
There is no comprehensive official data on
landmine casualties in Chechnya. However, there were almost daily reports of
mine incidents causing casualties in Chechnya in 2001. A representative of
Chechnya, when writing about the number of war-wounded people, including
landmine survivors, needing artificial limbs stated that in 2001 it was
estimated that the numbers had increased to 14,000, adding that there is
“no opportunity to receive more accurate information. We just know that
the number of victims increases
daily.”[31]
An analysis of reported incidents indicate that in 2001 there were at least
1,153 new casualties caused by landmine, UXO or IED incidents: 367 were killed
and 786 injured.[32] Of these
new casualties, 137 were civilians (62 killed and 75 injured) including 23
children, 43 were Chechen fighters (26 killed and 17 injured), 963 were from the
Russian armed forces, including police and interior ministry (279 killed and 684
injured), and the status of ten casualties was not reported.
In 2001, UNICEF recorded 154 new civilian casualties, of which 21 were killed
and 133 injured.[33]
According to the head receiving nurse at Hospital Number Nine in Grozny, the
hospital records five or six casualties of gunfire or landmines every
day.[34] NGOs working in
hospitals in Chechnya claim that there are between 30 and 50 civilians injured
each month in landmine incidents, with the majority of casualties occurring in
Grozny.[35] In 2001, medical
institutions in Chechnya registered 1,020 casualties with gunshot and landmine
injuries, as compared to 814 such casualties registered in
2000.[36] The ICRC reported
treating 240 mine/UXO casualties in the hospitals it supports in Chechnya,
Ingushetia and Dagestan in
2001.[37]
Included in the mine incidents in 2001 involving civilians are the following.
On 1 June 2001, a pregnant medical student was on her way home from exams when a
landmine exploded; she lost both her legs and the
baby.[38] On 4 August 2001, one
12-year old boy was killed and another injured after disturbing a tripwire on a
mine/IED causing it to explode in Grozny School 37, which had been destroyed
during military operations.[39]
On 7 August 2001, a local resident was killed by a mine in forested land in the
October area of Grozny. Relatives asked Chechen militia to help remove the
corpse. Two militia deminers were clearing the site when another mine exploded,
killing one deminer and injuring the
other.[40] On 16 October 2001,
a resident of Soltamuradov, bled to death after stepping on a mine while
collecting berries in a forest near his
village.[41]
Olara Otunnu, the United Nations special representative for children and
armed conflict, said in June 2002, “We estimate between 7,000 and 10,000
people have been maimed by landmines [in the course of two Chechen conflicts],
and easily more than half of those are
children."[42]
In 2001, UNICEF trained 30 UN and NGO staff on data collection and the local
NGO, Voice of the Mountains (VoM) on data management using the Information
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). Five trained representatives of
three local NGOs, VoM, Minga, and Let's Save the Generation, currently work on
gathering data in the territory of Chechnya and two VoM staff manage the
database in Ingushetia. As of July 2002, 750 landmine casualties have been
identified, of which 210 are children. Of the total casualties recorded, 7
percent were killed and 93 percent injured, 82 percent are male and 18 percent
female, and 32 percent required below-knee amputations while another 19 percent
required above-knee
amputations.[43]
From May 2000 to March 2001, the Human Rights Investigation Bureau of
Chechnya conducted field research in the southeastern region of Chechnya, and in
Ingushetia. The survey identified nearly 400 landmine
casualties.[44]
Surgical and general health facilities in Chechnya
remain devastated because of war damage and a lack of resources and maintenance.
When describing Grozny’s Hospital Number Nine, a journalist reported that
the hospital “has a sign and a gate; otherwise it could be mistaken for
more ruins. The five-story main building, once the hospital’s pride, is
windowless and pockmarked by
bullets.”[46] In 2001,
there were 55 hospitals, 34 polyclinics, 46 mobile clinics, and 187 mobile
clinic points in Chechnya; however, many often function without running water,
proper heating, or sewerage
systems.[47] A lack of skilled
staff, equipment, and the security situation also hampers the delivery of
adequate assistance.[48] In
June 2001, the ICRC held a two-day regional seminar in Moscow on war surgery;
among the 30 participants were ten surgeons and traumatologists from six Chechen
hospitals and from Ingushetia and
Dagestan.[49]
The ICRC regularly provides surgical support, medicines, and medical supplies
to improve the quality of care to nine referral hospitals in Chechnya and two
other hospitals in Ingushetia and Dagestan. In 2001, 700 war-wounded patients
were treated, including 240 mine/UXO
casualties.[50] The ICRC also
supports four mobile medical teams and a medical post run by the Russian Red
Cross.[51] On 13 March 2002,
the ICRC signed an agreement with the Chechen Ministry of Health and the Chechen
branch of the Russian Red Cross to assist the health facilities in Chechnya.
Assistance will include the repair of facilities, the supply of medicines, and
two Russian Red Cross mobile clinics will visit villages that only have a
first-aid post once or twice a
week.[52]
The World Health Organization (WHO) and UNICEF provide assistance throughout
Chechnya. Several other international agencies and NGOs also support the health
infrastructure in Chechnya with medicines, hospital supplies, expertise, and
training for local staff through hospitals, health posts, and mobile clinics in
11 towns, 42 villages, and in the IDP camps. These organizations include
Medecins du Monde, Medecins Sans Frontieres, Handicap International,
International Humanitarian Initiative, Hammer Forum, and World Vision
International.[53]
The Russian Center of Disaster Medicine (RCDM) “Zaschita” also
provides health services for civilians in the northern
Caucasus.[54]
UNICEF and UNHCR work in close cooperation with WHO and ICRC to provide a
comprehensive approach to survivor assistance by facilitating services for the
physical, psychosocial and vocational rehabilitation of mine survivors.
According to Boris Spivak, Head of the Department of Scientific Medical
Problems of Orthopedics of the Federal Center of Prosthetic Aid and
Rehabilitation of Invalids, among children alone there are currently at least
850 amputees (upper and lower limbs) in Chechnya needing regular prosthetic aid
and rehabilitation.[55]
In August 2000, UNICEF commenced its Mine Action Program in the North
Caucasus with survivor assistance being one of the main components. The program
which focuses on mine-injured children and women from Chechnya includes physical
rehabilitation, the fitting of prostheses, psychosocial counseling, and
vocational training. The program also established two amputee football clubs for
about 120 child mine survivors in Grozny and the IDP camps in Ingushetia. To
date UNICEF has not been able to raise sufficient funds to fully implement the
program.[56]
The physical rehabilitation component of the program started at the
Vladikavkaz Rehabilitation Center in December 2001 when 15 mine-affected
children started a two-month cycle of visits for ultrasound diagnostics,
massage, physiotherapy treatments, and psychosocial
support.[57]
UNICEF transports children and women from Chechnya and the IDP camps to the
Vladikavkaz Rehabilitation Center and the Vladikavkaz Prosthetic Center where in
addition to receiving orthopedic and assistive devices, there is a psychosocial
counselor to assist the patients in coping with their disability. In 2001, 89
children and women were fitted with artificial limbs and received counseling,
about 60 received corsets and bandages, and 240 wheelchairs, 1,050 walking
sticks, and 510 crutches were also
provided.[58]
Handicap International, supported by UNHCR, ECHO, Stichtung Fluchtling, and
Refugee International Japan, works in Chechnya to identify the needs of persons
with disabilities, including landmine survivors, in physical rehabilitation. In
2001, HI carried out an assessment on the rehabilitation of persons with
disabilities in Chechnya, interviewing 2,200 people. As no facilities exist in
Chechnya, future activities will focus on the development of rehabilitation
services. HI also supported the traumatology departments and distributed
surgical equipment to five hospitals, and distributed 1,000 walking sticks, 850
crutches, and 250
wheelchairs.[59] In 2002, it
plans to provide training in post-surgical rehabilitation to surgeons and
nursing staff from seven hospitals.
In October 2001, the ICRC signed an agreement with the federal Ministry of
Labor to provide further training for qualified Chechen staff to work at the
prosthetic/orthopedic center in Grozny. Throughout the year, the ICRC provided
wheelchairs and crutches to patients with
disabilities.[60] In November,
the WHO also held a training course for 14 prosthetic technicians and doctors on
manufacturing techniques for different types of
prostheses.[61]
On 20 February 2002, representatives of the Ministry of Labour and Social
Development of North Ossetia, the directors of the Grozny and Vladikavkaz
prosthetic/orthopedic workshops, and representatives of WHO, UNHCR, UNICEF, and
Handicap International met in Vladikavkaz for the fourth interagency
coordination meeting on prosthetic/orthopedic and psychological assistance to
war-wounded persons from Chechnya. Agreements in principal were reached on the
allocation of approximately 1 million Russian roubles (about US$31,700)
earmarked by the federal Ministry of Labour and Social Development for
prosthetic assistance to the war wounded from Chechnya. Initially, the funding
will be used for transporting ten Chechen amputees to Vladikavkaz each month
until the allocated funds are used up and the Grozny workshop is able to serve
the amputees itself. WHO agreed to further extend the prosthetic program in
Vladikavkaz to assist about 40 adult casualties of the
war.[62]
As of July 2002, the prosthetic/orthopedic workshop in Grozny had not
reopened.[63]
UNICEF, in cooperation with CARE International, continues to provide
psychosocial support to landmine and war traumatized children in the Doverie
Center in Vladikavkaz and in a counseling service at an IDP camp in
Ingushetia.[64] UNICEF’s
Psychosocial Program started in mid 2001 with an assessment of 167 children,
including 30 mine survivors and their families, in IDP camps in Ingushetia.
Three follow-up workshops have been held for 70 counselors, doctors, lawyers,
social workers, and monitors on assisting mine/UXO injured children and their
families.[65]
The UNICEF vocational training program provides children with daily four-hour
classes in English and computers. Vocational training is also offered at the
Sleptsovskaya Vocational Training College in Nazran in computers and accountancy
to mine survivors and female heads of households.
UNICEF also provides material assistance to mine survivors when a special
need is identified. For example, together with assistance from UNHCR and the
World Food Program, assistance in the form of mattresses, bed linen, blankets,
and food rations were provided to three children, who were all double amputees
as a result of landmine incidents and their families who lived in remote areas
of Chechnya.[66]
DISABILITY POLICY AND PRACTICE
The Federal Fund of Obligatory Medical Insurance
and a Russian Federation Ministry of Health decree, dated 16 May 2001, ensures
medical care for the Chechen population in other republics. In 2001, about
4,000 Chechen received medical care in neighboring regions because it could not
be provided in Chechnya.[67]
[1] For details on past use in the
1994-1996 conflict and the fighting post-September 1999, see Landmine Monitor
Reports 1999, 2000, and 2001. Also available through the Landmine Monitor
researcher for Russia is “The Chronicle of Mine War in Chechnya: Year
2000,” which gives a month-by-month snapshot of mine-related
operations/incidents in the war, gleaned from a survey of the media throughout
the year. [2] Landmine Monitor Report
2001, pp. 934-936. [3] See, for example,
Remarks of then Deputy Chief of the Military Engineering University, Major
General A. Nizhalovskii, in roundtable discussion of engineer equipment and
military operations in Chechnya, reported in Armeyskiy sbornik (Army
collection), No. 6, June 2000, pp. 35-40. Armeyskiy sbornik is a specialized
monthly analytical periodical covering a wide range of military-related issues
and problems. It contains a “roundtable section” in which military
authors may publish articles on a given subject. See also, “Chechens Say
Russians Laid 300,000 Mines,” Kavkaz-Tsentr News Agency (Internet), 5 June
2000; interview with Lieutenant-General Nikolai Serdtsev, December 1999;
“Night Patrol of ‘Fittermice,’” Rossiyskaya Gazeta
(official daily newspaper of Russian government), 21 January
2000. [4] “Russia Admits: Land
Mines all over Chechnya,” Agency Caucusus, 10 January 2001. Lyoma
Usmanav, Chechen representative in Washington, DC, in a letter to Jody Williams,
ICBL, dated 19 June 2001, stated that “the Russian command, several months
after the beginning of war, ‘boasted' about its 'achievements,' declaring
that they planted half a million mines against 'the Chechen
terrorists.’” [5] Umar
Khanbiev, Minister for Health of the Chechen republic, citation translated from
Russian by Landmine Monitor, 18 July 2002,
www.chechenpress.com. [6] Interviews
with officials from the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs during January-March
2002. [7] Interview with Colonel V.
Dushukhin, Commandant of Leninskaya, Grozny, 27 January
2002. [8] Response to Landmine Monitor
by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation, sent by fax to Landmine
Monitor Coordinator by Vassily V. Boriak, Counsellor, Embassy of the Russian
Federation to the United States, 16 August 2001. Original in Russian,
translated by Global Communications, LLC, Washington,
DC. [9] ORT television report, with
Akhmad Kadyrov, Head of the Chechen administration, and Stanislav Ilyasov, Head
of the Chechen government, March/April
2002. [10] Press Briefing by Special
Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, 1 July 2002, available at:
http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2002/otunnu.doc.htm. [11]
Interviews with engineers that served in the Chechen republic.
[12] Interviews with engineer
experts. [13] ABH Agency (daily news
digest), 19 April 2001. see
www.abnews.ru. [14] See: http: //
kavkaz.memo.ru/newstext/news/id/414606. html ; "INTERFAX ," Voennykh Novostey
(Military News) at
http://www.militarynews.ru/. [15] For
example, see Scott Peterson, “’Lawless’ Russian Actions
Reflect Mounting Frustration,” Christian Science Monitor, 13 July
2001. [16] Fred Weir, “Chechen
conflict festers with use of land mines,” Christian Science Monitor, 6
February 2002. [17] For details of the
mine problem resulting from the 1994-96 fighting, see Landmine Monitor Report
1999, p. 844. See also Landmine Monitor Report 2000, pp. 870-871, for a
description of the problem by the end of that monitoring
period. [18] “U.N. envoy says
Chechen kids run landmine gauntlet,” Reuters (Chechnya), Moscow, 24 June
2002. See also, Press Briefing by Special Representative for Children and Armed
Conflict, 1 July 2002, available at:
http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2002/otunnu.doc.htm. [19]
Interviews with Russian engineers. [20]
Landmine Monitor researchers prepared a 30-page list of these efforts in
Chechnya during 2001, using Russian media reports and reporting by Memorial and
other human rights groups (see: “Confrontation in the Chechnya: The
chronicle of violence,” Information provided by “Memorial”
human rights center in Nazran, 8 May 2002,
http://www.memo.ru/hr/hotpoints/N-Caucas/hronics/.) [21]
ABH Agency, 19 April 2001. [22]
“Over 1,000 Explosive Devices Said Defused In Chechnya This Year
Moscow,” (in English), ITAR-TASS, 18 June
2002. [23] UNICEF Mine Action Program in
The Northern Caucuses, at:
http://www.mineaction.org/misc/dynamic_overview.cfm?did=14; email from Aida
Ailarova, National Officer for MA, UNICEF, Vladikavkaz, 11 July
2002. [24] Email from Aida Ailarova,
National Officer for MA, UNICEF, Vladikavkaz, 11 July
2002. [25] Email from Enrico Leonardi,
Program Coordinator, UNICEF, Vladikavkaz, 11 July 2002.
[26] Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp.
893-908. [27] Data Compiled from ICRC
Russia Web Site, at:
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57ZJZ4!Open. [28]
Ibid. [29] Emergency action of the Red
Cross and Red Crescent Movement for the North Caucasus and the South of
Russia (April-May 2002), at:
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/5BB9GN?OpenDocument&style=custo_final. [30]
Ibid. [31] Letter to Landmine Monitor
(Tamara Mazaeva) from Ali Asaev, Representative of the Chechen Government in
Azerbaijan, Baku, 15 February 2002; see also Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p.
944. [32] Data collated by Landmine
Monitor from media reports, human rights reports, RF MoESDC, Ministry of
Internal Affairs, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of
Health. [33] Emails to Landmine Monitor
from Aida Ailarova, National Officer for Mine Action and Enrico Leonardi,
Program Coordinator, UNICEF, Vladikavkaz, 29 July
2002. [34] Sharon LaFraniere,
“Grozny Experiences Peace in Name Only Despite Russian Assurance of
Safety, Chechen Capital Lives Under Siege,” Washington Post, 25 June
2001. [35] Information from various
unofficial sources sent to Landmine Monitor (HIB) by Catherine Naughton, Program
Manager, Handicap International North Caucasus, 30 July
2002. [36] WHO, “Health Action
– in the North Caucasus,” Newsletter on Emergency Preparedness and
Response, April/May 2002, p. 7. [37]
ICRC Special Report, Mine Action 2001, Geneva, July 2002, p.
35. [38] Sharon LaFraniere,
“Grozny Experiences Peace in Name Only,” Washington Post, 25 June
2001. [39] “Confrontation in
Chechnya: The chronicle of violence,” information from the
“Memorial” human rights center in
Nazran. [40] “Confrontation in
Chechnya: The chronicle of violence,” information from the
“Memorial” human rights center in
Nazran. [41]
Ibid. [42] “U.N. envoy says
Chechen kids run landmine gauntlet,” Reuters (Moscow), 24 June
2002. [43] Emails to Landmine Monitor
from Aida Ailarova, National Officer for Mine Action and Enrico Leonardi,
Program Coordinator, UNICEF, Vladikavkaz, 29 July
2002. [44] For full details on the
survey and other casualty data see Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp.
944-946. [45] Information in this
section focuses on civilian mine casualties as Russian military mine casualties
receive medical care in military hospitals and subsequent
rehabilitation. [46] Sharon LaFraniere,
“Grozny Experiences Peace in Name Only,” Washington Post, 25 June
2001. [47] WHO, “Health Action in
the North Caucasus,” Newsletter, April/May 2002, p.
7. [48] WHO, “ICRC Assessments in
Ingushetia and Chechnya,” “Health Action in the North
Caucasus”, Newsletter, October/November 2001, p.
2. [49] WHO, “Health Action in the
North Caucasus,” Newsletter, April/May 2002, p.
7. [50] ICRC Special Report, Mine Action
2001, Geneva, July 2002, p. 35. [51]
ICRC Fact and Figures, Emergency Action of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement for the North Caucasus and the South of Russia, December 2001, p.
3. [52] ICRC News, “Medical aid
stepped up in Chechen Republic,” 21 March
2002. [53] UN OCHA website; see also
Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p.
907. [54] See Landmine Monitor Report
2001, pp. 946-947. [55] Interview with
Boris Spivak at the Federal Center of Prosthetic Aid and Rehabilitation of
Invalids, July 6, 2001. [56] ICBL
Portfolio of Landmine Victim Assistance Programs, accessed at
www.landminevap.org. [57] Email from
Aida Ailarova, UNICEF, 29 July
2002. [58] Email from Aida Ailarova,
UNICEF, 29 July 2002; see also WHO, “Health Action in the North
Caucasus,” Newsletter, February/March 2002, p.
10. [59] Email to Landmine Monitor from
Catherine Naughton, Program Manager, Handicap International North Caucasus, 29
July 2002. [60] ICRC Special Report,
Mine Action 2001, Geneva, July 2002, p.
35. [61] WHO, “Health Action in
the North Caucasus,” Newsletter, December 2001, p.
6. [62] WHO, “Health Action in the
North Caucasus,” Newsletter, February/March 2002, p.
10. [63] Email from Catherine Naughton,
Handicap International North Caucasus, 29 July
2002. [64] UN OCHA, Humanitarian Action
in the North Caucasus information bulletin, 1-16 June
2002. [65] Email from Aida Ailarova,
UNICEF, 29 July 2002. [66] UNICEF
Northern Caucasus Situation Report: 9 June-1 July
2001. [67] WHO, “Health Action in
the North Caucasus,” Newsletter, April/May 2002, p. 7.
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